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Abstract
There is an inherent externality across generations in environmental economics: extensive use
of the natural environment by the current generation may affect the welfare of future generations.
The use of the natural environment includes not only the reduction of resource stocks, like fossil
fuels and rain forests, but also the accumulation of pollution stocks. Efficient policy directed to
changing the resource extraction and pollution profiles needs to take into account the internal
and external forces driving resource markets and their impacts on the aggregate economy. But
compliance to these measures is not warranted unless there is an implicit or explicit (or both)
enforcement mechanism in place.
The traditional approach to discuss the optimal centralized exploitation policy has been to
assume that individuals are narrowly self-interested. Empirical evidence suggests, however,
that individuals’ characteristics (heterogeneity) play a key role in resolving collective action
problems. Chapter 1 develops a dynamic model of common renewable resources management
where a centralized mechanism works together with a self-enforcement one—guided by social
norms—to form an institution. The results provide a theoretical explanation for the evidence of
why economies with abundance of resource stocks may not improve their institutions while others
with scarcity of resource stocks may do.
Institutional context is likely to determine the impact of trade liberalization on welfare
and resource conservation. Chapter 2 follows the recent literature on trade and endogenously
determined institution to investigate this link further. It combines a common renewable resource
model with elements of moral hazard and identifies conditions under which countries escape
the ‘tragedy of commons’. It shows that country characteristics and technologies in alternative
sources of income determine how centralized institutions perform and whether there are gains
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from trade.
A key issue underlying global environmental protection is that international trade puts
downward pressure on countries’ environmental standards. Chapter 3 explores—within an
imperfectly competitive environment—the welfare implications of taxation when production
causes environmental pollution (a global public bad) under two tax principles, ‘destination’ and
‘origin’. It shows that the noncooperative environmental tax policy does not always give rise to
taxes that are too low in equilibrium, from welfare point of view, and identifies conditions under
which the presence of a global public bad tilts the welfare comparison towards, interestingly,
either tax principle.
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Chapter 1 Common pool resources, compliance and evolution of social norms1
1.1 Introduction
Theoretical work has shown that—in the absence of individual property rights in the
stock—open-access/common-pool renewable resources2 will be overexploited and may even
be completely destroyed if exploitation brings the stock to a level that cannot regenerate itself.
Underlying this ‘tragedy of the commons’ is the idea that rational self-interested individuals
unduly discount the impact their decision has on the productive capabilities of others and so they
extract more resources that it is optimal from a global welfare perspective.3
Though, arguably, it is in the interest of each individual to agree collectively to an efficient
level of resource exploitation in the long run, in the absence of a centralized mechanism
such an agreement is difficult to be enforced.4 Recognizing this possibility, the literature has
analyzed various forms of centralized mechanisms that regulate the expropriation of common-
pool renewable resources—thereby internalizing the externalities associated with individual
behaviour—and provide insights on how the economic environment affects institutions.5 In a
recent contribution—and one that is close to the issues addressed in this chapter—Copeland
and Taylor (2009) emphasize country and resource characteristics as important determinants
of the performance of centralized institutions. Their analysis focuses on the role of trade
1 I am indebted to Cuong Le Van for many insightful discussions, which have helped me clarify some of the issues and
for carefully reading of earlier versions of this chapter. Thanks also to my PhD colleague Giuseppe Bova, Brian
Copeland, Harris Dellas, seminar participants at the University of Exeter, and conference participants at CRETE,
Naxos 2013, for helpful comments and suggestions.
2 Examples of common-pool renewable resources include, among others, groundwater basins, irrigation systems,
forests, and grazing lands.
3 Early contributions on this include, among others, Gordon (1954), Hardin (1968), Smith (1968), Clark (1973), and
Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
4 Throughout the analysis, the centralized mechanisms will be used to define any institution imposed by government
(‘formal institutions’) while the decentralized mechanisms will be used to define any self-governing institution
(‘informal institutions’).
5 For a review of the literature on the role of trade liberalization on the management of common-pool renewable
resources and welfare see Bulte and Barbier (2005).
8
liberalization in causing a transition to more effective resource management. They predict that
trade-induced higher relative resource prices6 can improve institutional context depending on
some country characteristics. While this perspective is clearly an important one, in the sense
that changes in prices may provide incentives to alter de facto property right regimes,7 it ignores
the role of population characteristics (heterogeneity) and the existence of some form of local
self-enforcement in shaping institutions. Recognizing these dimensions is valuable: it would
certainly be naive to imagine that actual exploitation decisions of a common good are shaped only
by a collective good (driven, possibly, by social norms). But nor are they always easily explained
in terms of narrowly defined self-interest. Altruism, reciprocity, and civic virtues are powerful
and common motivations of individuals who agree to cooperate in collective action problems.8 In
this context, however, one recognizes that exogenous changes can influence individual choice and,
hence, the effects of changes in relative prices should track changes in behaviour.
The objective of this chapter is to introduce a form of local self-enforcement into a standard
renewable resource model where the exploitation decision is centralized and identify conditions
under which full compliance with the regulation is attained (or not). Self-enforcement is guided
by norms that regulate work effort. These norms set limits on what is perceived as proper effort
that is, the level of effort that each worker is authorized to put in harvesting the common. Yet
norms dictate punishment for the non-follower workers with personal cost.9 Arguably, following
the norms is costly but it is not always out of self-interest. Collective subscription to the norms
may improve welfare by increasing compliance rates and, hence, future exploitation. To arrive
6 The assumption here is that the country in question is resource-rich implying that it faces higher prices after trade
liberalization and becomes a net exporter (at least in the short run).
7 This is reminiscent of Demsetz’s (1967) view that a new institution emerges when expected benefits exceed costs.
8 For a general treatment of this see, for example, Fehr and Gachter (2000), and Bernhard et al. (2006). For
experimental evidence in common-pool resource problems see, for example, Ostrom (2000), Casari and Plott (2003),
Janssen and Ostrom (2007), and Rodríguez-Sickert (2007).
9 Copeland and Taylor (2009) emphasize that monitoring is the fundamental problem in countries with de facto open
access resource management regime. According to Ostrom (1990) this problem can be overcome by some form of
group-monitoring and sanctioning. This chapter examines this possibility. Section 2.4.1 discusses the possibility of
mixed sanctioning (formal and informal).
9
at this, the model features two types of workers: those who abide and enforce the rules, formal
and informal, and those who do not. Centralization, on the other hand, implies that a social
planner regulates the use of a renewable resource by setting rules limiting harvests recognizing,
however, that evolution pressure weeds out strategies with lower payoffs, and so it may cause
the norms to disappear. In response to this threat, the social planner must take into account the
distributional effects of policy.10 This feature is captured here by considering the effects of policy
on the payoff-differential between the two types of workers. The social planner does not observe
which particular worker is adopting the norms and which is not: all she observes is the proportion
of the population of each group-type and the size of the resource stock. Given this information,
the social planner maximizes welfare subject to the evolution of population composition (which
follows the replicator dynamics) and the evolution of resource stock. In doing so, this chapter
contributes to the relevant literature by allowing for an endogenously (and jointly) determination
of the population composition, resource stock, and optimal harvesting rule. This enables one to
reflect the effects of changes in observable parameters through to changes in behaviour to changes
in resource stock and to changes in optimal harvesting rule.
The results show that two equilibria are possible under regulation. In one equilibrium, the
norms are followed and so full compliance with the regulation is achieved, whereas in the other
norms break down and open access prevails. More specifically, if the natural productivity of the
resource is greater than the productivity of harvest (abundance of stock), then both equilibria are
possible. If the cost of enforcement is greater than the cost of punishment, and provided that the
initial proportion of population that disobeys the norms is relatively large, then the institutional
outcome will be open access. On the contrary, if the cost of enforcement is lower than the cost
of punishment, and provided that the initial proportion of population that disobeys the norms is
10 Margolis (1982) argues that there should be a mechanism that protects the less selfish individuals. Otherwise, the
group-interested individuals would be eliminated because within-group selection would always favor self-interested
individuals.
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relatively small, then the institutional outcome will be full compliance. If, however, the natural
productivity of the resource is lower than the productivity of harvest (scarcity of stock), then the
institutional outcome will be full compliance.11
The analysis of this chapter is not the first to combine population dynamics with stock
dynamics in common-pool renewable resource problems. Early important contributions include
Sethi and Somanathan (1996), and Xepapadeas (2005). There are, however, distinct differences
between those earlier contributions and the present chapter. Like Sethi and Somanathan (1996),
this chapter discusses the role of social norms on common-pool resource problems. They show
that, in the absence of a centralized mechanism, non-cooperative behaviour is always stable
while cooperative behaviour (guided by social norms) can be stable under certain conditions. On
the grounds of such a consideration, the authors argue that this outcome threats the viability of
resource and thereby there is a scope for some form of centralized mechanism to be enacted. Our
analysis therefore extends Sethi and Somanathan’s results by envolving such a mechanism. Like
Xepapadeas (2005), this chapter considers the evolution of individuals’ decision to comply (or
not) with the regulation. Unlike Xepapadeas, who takes as given the optimal harvesting rule and
investigates the evolutionary dynamics, this chapter does analyze the optimal harvesting policy,
given not only the partial compliance on the part of individuals but also the presence of informal
institutions that can influence individuals’ choice.
The plan of this chapter is the following. Section 1.2 sets out the model. Section 1.3 then
derives the properties of the optimal harvesting policy paths. Section 1.4 further clarifies the
analysis through numerical examples. Finally, Section 1.5 briefly concludes.
1.2 Description of the model
The framework is familiar from Copeland and Taylor (2009): the new element being the
introduction of heterogeneity established by social norms and evolutionary dynamics.12 The
11 Examples which are consistent with the above scenaria are provided below.
12 The present framework features—in explaining the evolution of norms—elements discussed in Axelrod (1986,
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economy features N workers, Nn of which subscribe to social norms and the rest, denoted by Nr,
are not. (For wanting a convenient label we call the former ‘norm-guided’ workers and the latter
‘rational-guided’ workers.) Defining
nn =
Nn
N
; nr =
Nr
N
; (1.1)
where nn and nr give the proportion of the norm-guided and rational-guided workers, respectively,
it is the case that
nn + nr = 1: (1.2)
The economy produces two goods, harvesting and manufacturing. Labor in harvesting, denoted
by Lh, is composed of labor from the Nr-workers, denoted by Lhr , and labor from the Nn-workers,
denoted by Lhn, and so
Lh = L
h
r + L
h
n: (1.3)
To simplify matters it is assumed, and without loss of generality, that all Nr-workers spend all
their time harvesting the resource implying, following from (1.1), that
Lhr = Nr = Nnr; (1.4)
whereas a proportion ln of the endowment of the Nn-workers is devoted to harvesting and (1  ln)
to manufacturing thus
Lhn = lnNn = lnNnn: (1.5)
The implication of this is that if lnt = 1 then the Nn-workers will work full-time in the harvesting
sector, but if lnt 6= 1 they will work either full-time or part-time in the manufacturing sector (we
return to this shortly below).
Making use of (1.2), (1.4) and (1.5) the aggregate labor allocated to harvesting is given by
Lh = L
h
r + L
h
n = N(nr + nnln) = N [nr + (1  nr)ln] : (1.6)
p.1097): ‘A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are
often punished when seen not to be acting in this way.’ Therefore, a norm will exist in the long run if it widely
coordinates the behaviour of the members of a society, but also, it is enforced by the members via punishing violators
(see also Elster, 1989).
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With no Nr-workers working in the manufacturing sector aggregate labor in this sector is given
by
Lm = L
m
n ; (1.7)
or, equivalently,
Lm = (1  ln)(1  nr)N: (1.8)
Output in harvesting depends on labor input and available stock, and is given by13
H = qLhS; (1.9)
where q > 0 is a productivity parameter and S  0 denotes the available resource stock. Making
use of (1.6) in (1.9) it is then the case that
H = qN [nr + (1  nr)ln]S; (1.10)
and so output in harvesting depends on—in addition to q and S—the composition of labor: Nr-
and Nn-workers.
Production in manufacturing is subject to constant returns to scale with, by choice of units,
M = Lm; (1.11)
which upon making use of (1.8), becomes
M = (1  ln)(1  nr)N: (1.12)
Denoting the price of the harvest good by p; and by w the wage available in manufacturing, a
norm-guided worker earns pqSln from harvesting and w(1  ln) from manufacturing. To capture
the self-enforcement mechanism, it is assumed that a norm-guided worker incurs a cost  to
detect a rational-guided worker. Detection occurs with probability . If a rational-guided worker
is detected then her/his behaviour becomes common knowledge. In this case—following from
the symmetry of individuals—each of the Nn-workers punishes each of the Nr- detected workers.
Expected cost of detection is then Nr whereas expected income of a norm-guided worker,
13 This form of production function in harvesting has been widely used in the literature of renewable resource
management. See, for example, Copeland and Taylor (2009).
13
denoted by n, is given by
n = pqSln + (1  ln)w   nrN: (1.13)
It then follows that expected income of all Nn-workers, denoted by rn, is
rn = Nnn = [pqSln + (1  ln)w   nrN ]nnN: (1.14)
Each norm-guided worker imposes a fine  to a detected rational-guided worker. The probability
of a rational-guided worker being seen by any norm-guided worker is . Expected fine is,
therefore, .14 Each rational-guided worker earns an income equal to pqS and receives a fine (if
detected)—imposed by all Nn-workers—equal to Nn = nnN . Income, denoted by r, of a
rational-guided worker is, therefore, given by
r = pqS   nnN; (1.15)
whereas expected income for all Nr-workers, denoted by rr, is given by
rr = Nrr = (pqS   nnN)nrN: (1.16)
1.2.1 Evolution of population composition and resource stock
The population composition follows the evolutionary approach.15 The basic feature of this
approach16 is that players are not assumed to be so rational, correctly anticipating the other
players’ choices, but instead they learn from the experience of other players’ past choices. The
simplest description of such dynamic learning process—and one adopted here—is one that
follows the replicator dynamics (we turn to this shortly below).
The payoff to each strategy type (that is, norm-guided or rational-guided worker), given the
14 Several sanctioning activities, undertaken by appropriators, have been documented by Ostrom (1990)—and, in
particular, in Chapter 3. These sanctions can be in the form of social disapproval, social isolation, loss reputation or
even (closer to the modeling strategy here) small penalties.
15 Sethi and Somanathan (2006) provide an alternative modeling of strategies to cooperation in collective management
of commons. Moreover, in their model, the cooperative behaviour is induced by the reciprocity of individuals to
punish violators of agreements for behaving cooperatively, instead by norms as here.
16 And one that distinguishes it from the traditional game theoretic approach. On the use of the replicator dynamics
in the evolution of population composition of a common-pool problem, see also Sethi and Somanathan (1996) and
Xepapadeas (2005).
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population composition of strategies and the fact that nn + nr = 1, is defined as
n = (pqS   w)ln + (1  ln)w   nrN; (1.17)
for each norm-guided worker, and
r = pqS   w   (1  nr)N; (1.18)
for each rational–guided worker. Close inspection of (1.18) reveals that the payoffs of Nr-workers
are increasing in the resource rents, given by pqS   w > 0,17 and decreasing in the cost of being
fined by the Nn-workers, given by (1  nr)N > 0. Clearly if pqS   w  0, then Nr-workers
will receive non-positive payoffs, independently of the cost of being fined. In this case, adapting
the rational strategy may confer no gains relative to the social-norm one.
In particular, the rate of growth (decay) of the share of population using the rational-guided
strategy is assumed to be proportional to the amount by which that strategy’s payoff exceeds (falls
below) the average payoff of the strategies in the population. With—following from (1.17) and
(1.18)—average payoff being given by
 = nrr + (1  nr)n; (1.19)
the evolution of the population share nr is defined as
nrt+1   nrt = nrt(rt   t); (1.20)
which—upon using (1.2), (1.17) and (1.18)—can be written as
nrt+1   nrt = (1  nrt)nrtf(pqSt   2w)(1  lnt)  N [   ( + )nrt ]g: (1.21)
The growth function of the resource is assumed to be (as it is typically the case) logistic and given
by
G(S) = aS

1  S
K

; (1.22)
with18 G(0) = G(Smax) = 0, G0(Smsy) = 0 and G00(S) < 0 for 0  S  Smax. Smax denotes the
17 This is a standard definition of resource rents (per unit of labor) where pqS gives the return from harvesting, and w
captures the opportunity cost of labor in harvesting.
18 A prime denotes the derivative of a function of one variable.
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maximum self-sustaining population size, and Smsy the population size producing the maximum
sustainable yield.19 a > 0 is the intrinsic rate of resource growth, and K is the carrying capacity.
Harvesting affects the resource stock, with its evolution being determined by
St+1   St = G(St) Ht; (1.23)
which upon use of (1.10) and (1.22), becomes
St+1   St = aSt

1  St
K

  qN [nrt + (1  nrt)lnt ]St: (1.24)
The analysis now turns to the optimal harvesting policy.
1.3 Optimal harvesting policy
There is a representative consumer in the economy with expected income, denoted by R, equal
to the sum of the incomes of both types of workers, Nn and Nr. Making use of (1.14) and (1.16),
income is given by
R = (pqSt   w)(1  nrt)Nlnt + [w(1  nrt) + pqStnrt ]N   (1  nrt)( + )N2nrt : (1.25)
Close inspection of (1.25) reveals that income is a linear function of the harvesting rule lnt which
affects income through resource rents, pqSt   w, and the proportion of norm-guided workers,
1   nrt . If rents are zero—implying that pqSt = w—then lnt is, as a choice variable, redundant.
The reason for this is that, following from (1.18), no worker wishes to behave as a Nr-worker as
she can earn negative payoffs. The implication of this is that in a society where the norms are
followed, regulation is unnecessary. Conversely, in a society where no one obeys social norms that
is, nrt = 1, regulation is—by assumption—meaningless. If, however, nrt < 1, and the resource
rents are positive (negative)—in the sense that pqSt > (<)w, the maximum lnt will increase
(reduce) income. In other words, if resource rents are positive, and so long as the constraints
upon the state variable S do not become binding, then the optimal solution will be lnt = 1 that
is, full-time in the harvesting sector for all workers. But if the constraints become binding at the
19 For later use, the maximum self-sustaining population size is attained when the population size is exactly at the
carrying capacity, that is Smax = K, while the maximum sustainable yield when the population size is exactly at half
of the carrying capacity, that is Smsy = K=2:
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optimum lnt = 1, then the best that can be done will be to permit norm-guided workers to spend
the maximum lnt in harvesting that is, to work either in both sectors or only in manufacturing.
Regarding the (income equivalent) value of self-enforcement (given by nnt( + )N2(1  nnt)),
one observes that, for any given population composition, it depends on the relative magnitude of
enforcement and sanctioning costs.
Income, R, is used only for consumption and so total welfare is given by
max
1X
t=0
tU(Rt); (1.26)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate. The function U has the standard properties: it is strictly
increasing, concave, and differentiable, and so U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0:
The optimal harvesting policy is then characterized by maximizing (1.26) subject to the income
constraint (1.25), the evolution equation of the population composition (1.21), the evolution
equation of resource stock (1.24), and the appropriate restrictions on the state variables—given by
S = St and nr = nrt—and on the control variable—given by ln = lnt . Substituting (1.25) into
the objective function (1.26), the social planner’s problem (‘regulator’) can be expressed more
compactly as20
max
lnt
1X
t=0
tU(Rt); (1.27)
20 Notice that the social welfare is symmetric so that permutation of utilities is a matter of social indifference. Another
possibility will be to allow the two types of workers to be treated asymmetrically. For example, one may wish to give
the norm-guided workers some priority by giving their utilities more weight in the social welfare function. However,
this may not be true in view of the crowding-out argument. Analyzing the effects of a weighted utilitarian social
welfare function on the optimal allocation is outside the scope of this chapter and remains a topic of further research.
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subject to, for all t,
nrt+1 = [(1  nrt)f(pqSt   2w)(1  lnt)  N [   ( + )nrt ]g+ 1]nrt ; (1.28)
St+1 = aSt(1  St=K) + [1  qNnrt   (1  nrt)lnt ]St; (1.29)
0  nrt  1; (1.30)
0  St  K; (1.31)
0  lnt  1; (1.32)
with S0 2 (0; K], nr0 2 (0; 1) given.
A discussion on how the constraints, given in (1.28) and (1.29), expect to influence the
optimal policy, will prove useful for understanding the characterization of the equilibrium. Close
inspection of (1.28) reveals two interesting features of the evolution of population composition.
Firstly—following from the fact that if nrt = 1 then nrt+1 = 1 and if nrt = 0 then nrt+1 = 0—a
state with only either Nr- or Nn-workers can be an equilibrium. Secondly, if both types of
individuals are present, and so nrt < 1, then the evolution of the population depends on the relative
magnitude of pqSt   2w and    ( + )nrt . The sign of pqSt   2w determines whether, and
how, the formal institution, captured by lnt , affects behaviour, whereas the sign of    ( + )nrt
determines how informal institutions affect behaviour.21 Recalling that the cost of being fined is
given by (1 nrt) whereas the cost of enforcement is given nrt , it is convenient in what follows
to refer to the norms being effective if the latter is sufficiently higher than the former.22
If pqSt  2w > 0 the regulator can cause a decline in the proportion of rational-guided workers
21 This, in turn, implies that which norm of behaviour will be followed in the long-run is partly endogenous to the model
and partly due to history.
22 Or equivalently, when the proportion of rational-guided workers, nrt , is smaller than the threshold = ( + ) so that
[   ( + )nrt ] > 0: Conversely, the norms are ineffective when [   ( + )nrt ] < 0: The values of probability
of been caught, , the cost of enforcement, , the cost of being fined, , and size of population, N , can qualitatively
affect the population dynamics. Population growth can increase anonymity within individuals by diminishing the
psychological impact of fines on behaviour. Yet it can reduce (improve) the monitoring capabilities or increase
(reduce) the cost of enforcement if the new members adopt the rational (norm)-guided behaviour. Beyond its impact
on the self-enforcement power, population growth can affect the harvesting gains, too. It can raise the prices (through
an increase in demand), or it can reduce both the wage rate (through an increase in labor) and the resource stock. For
a discussion of the role of population growth, see also Sethi and Somanathan (1996) and Copeland and Taylor (2009).
The issue of the effect of the parameters values , , and  is discussed below.
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by setting the maximum lnt : By doing so, she wishes to decrease the payoff differential between
the norm-guided and the rational-guided strategy. Interestingly, following from (1.25), she also
increases income, R, since this implies that pqSt   w > 0 holds too. Notice, however, that this
policy will not necessarily ensure that there will be a return to the norm-guided behaviour in the
long-run. The gains of the rational-guided behaviour will decline over time if there is a subsequent
decline in the stock so to offset the advantage of working full-time in harvesting and/or if there
is sufficient self-enforcement power. The first effect depends critically on the availability of
resource stock (we turn to this shortly below). The second effect depends on the effectiveness of
norms defined in the preceding paragraph. It is, therefore, the case that when the proportion of
rational-guided workers is sufficiently high self-enforcement power must be strong (in the sense of
effective norms) to reduce the gains from defection. The explanation behind this is also intuitive:
when the proportion of rational-guided workers is sufficiently high, either the cost of enforcement
 must be small or the cost of punishment  large. Otherwise, given the high extraction levels, the
rational-guided workers will also receive high payoffs. As a result, their proportion will increase
under the evolutionary pressure (the cost of punishing many people is significantly high or, to put
it differently, it costs very little to be punished by few people and so workers prefer to behave
rationally).
If, turning now to the opposite case, pqSt   2w < 0 then the regulator cause a reduction in the
proportion of rational-guided workers by setting the minimum lnt . If lnt happens to be smaller
than one, then she can restrict harvesting. If not, the resource stock will decline over time and so
pqSt w < 0 may hold too. But negative resource rents imply the need of institutional change and
the proportion of population following the rational-guided strategy will, as noted earlier, decline.
In addition, following from (1.25), negative resource rents require setting lnt = 0. It is possible,
however, the minimum value of lnt that satisfies the constraint in (1.28) to be different than zero.
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The implication of this is that by setting the minimum lnt regulation might reduce welfare or,
if it happens for the choice variable to be lnt = 0, regulation might increase the proportion of
rational-guided workers (these cases are illustrated below).
The preceding discussion emphasizes that population dynamics may work as a binding force
in limiting harvesting, thereby making the regulator unable to avoid the reduction in the stock. In
principle, following from (1.29), as long as the rate of resource growth does not exceed the rate
of harvesting, the resource will tend to decline over time. What all this boils down to is that the
rate of intrinsic growth, a > 0, relative to the harvesting productivity parameter, q > 0, plays a
critical role in the availability of the resource stock over time and, hence, in the sustainability of
positive rents. If the ratio of the intrinsic growth rate to the productivity parameter, a=q, is above
(below) the threshold N [nrt + (1  nrt)lnt ] (1  St=K), we will take it to mean that there is stock
abundance (scarcity).23
If the ratio a=q is sufficiently ‘high’ then the resource is capable of generating positive rents
over time. It then follows that harvesting gains are ‘large’ and, hence, more workers will want
to move to the harvesting sector. Consequently, the regulator must allow all workers to work
full-time in harvesting without, however, driving the resource to extinction.24 On the other
hand, if the ratio a=q is ‘small’ then the stock will tend to decline over time. Intuitively, a high
productivity in harvesting will initially raise its rate of return and so the harvesting rate. But given
that the harvesting rate is higher than the replenishment rate, the stock will decline (especially if
S0 > K=2). Eventually, the induced scarcity of the stock will cause rent depletion. In this case,
the payoff differential between the Nr- and Nn-workers tends to reduce so the regulator may find
it easier to ensure full compliance, even if self-enforcement power is weak. What is critical here,
23 The threshold value is determined by the labor employed in harvesting, given by N [nrt + (1  nrt)lnt ], and
the accelerating pressure on the natural population imposed by the constant environment, given by (1  St=K).
Therefore, for any given level of total effort, this value is increasing as S is small relative to K.
24 In fact, the maximum rate of harvesting can be consistent with an increasing stock if the initial size of resource stock,
S0, is in the demographic interval where conditions are favorable, that is S0 < K=2 (an illustration of this follows
shortly below).
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however, is whether full compliance is attained while the resource is still in existence that is,
St > 0.
25 Having discussed the range of possibilities that can potentially arise, the analysis now
turns to the study of the properties of the equilibrium.
It helps the exposition if the rhs of constraints in (1.28) and (1.29) are expressed as
	1(St; nrt ; lnt) and 	2(St; nrt ; lnt), respectively. The sequences of S, nr, ln are feasible, starting
from feasible S0 2 (0; K] and nr0 2 (0; 1), if they satisfy the constraints, for all t,
0  	1(St; nrt ; lnt)  1; (1.33)
0  	2(St; nrt ; lnt)  K: (1.34)
Let 
(St; nrt) denote the set of all lnt such that (1.33) and (1.34) are satisfied. We next investigate
the set 
. Fix a period t, for given St and nrt , and denote by A(S; nr) the subset of 
 containing
all ln such that (1.33) is satisfied, and by B(S; nr) the subset of 
 that contains all ln such that
(1.34) holds. Then 
 = A \ B. The strategy now is to investigate the sets A(S; nr) and B(S; nr).
We start from the former set.
Delegating the details in an Appendix, we now state the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1 The setA(S; nr) is either empty or it takes the form of an order interval [L1(St; nrt); L2(St; nrt)]
where
L1(St; nrt) = max
(
0; 1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w ; 1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w
)
;
and
L2(St; nrt) = min
(
1; 1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w ; 1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w
)
:
Lemma 2 The setB(S; nr) is either empty or it takes the form of an order interval [L3(St; nrt); L4(St; nrt)]
where
L3(St; nrt) = max

0;
a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St
1  nrt

; (1.35)
and
L4(St; nrt) = min

1;
1  qNnrt + aSt(1  St=K)
1  nrt

: (1.36)
25 The threshold value of the stock for which the resource will become extinct differs among resources. For practical
purposes this value is typically considered to be zero.
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Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, the set 
(S; nr) is defined as the set of feasible solutions
lnt 2 fL(St; nrt); L(St; nrt)g; (1.37)
where L(St; nrt) = maxfL1; L3g, and L(St; nrt) = minfL2; L4g.
In light of Lemmas 1 and 2 and the fact that income R is linear in ln, the optimal solution is
characterized as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that 0 < nrt < 1. Then, a solution, if it exists, takes the following form
lnt =
8<: L if pqSt   w > 0;(L;L) if pqSt   w = 0;
L if pqSt   w < 0;
(1.38)
where L and L are defined as above.
Having determined lnt , we next determine the values of n

rt and S

t from (1.28) and (1.29),
respectively. The same procedure can be applied to compute the sequence fS; nr; lng 8T > t.
Finally, 8t fSt ; nrt ; lntg must satisfy Rt > 0.
The result in—beyond the discussion leading to—Proposition 3 does not lend itself to an
intuitive characterization. It is thus instructive to provide simple examples that show the richness
of possibilities that arise with respect to the success or failure of institutions regarding the
management of the commons.26 Two kind of resources (with respect to their availability) would
be particularly useful to explore, as they have attracted a lot of attention in the literature: abundant
and scarce. We turn to this next.
1.4 Abundant and scarce renewable stock: Further analysis
The key parameters of the model are the initial resource stock S0, the initial proportion of
rational-guided individuals nr0 , the harvest good price p, the wage rate w, the productivity
parameter q, the resource intrinsic growth rate a, the carrying capacity K, the enforcement cost
, the punishment cost , the probability of been caught , and the size of population N . In all
numerical examples that follow, the wage rate and the population size are set equal to unity, and
26 Computations, available upon request, have been performed in Matlab.
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the maximum size of the resource is K = 10. The future harvesting policy is to be decided at time
t  2. All reported results satisfy that income R is positive.
1.4.1 Abundance of renewable resource stock
A basic concern in the literature of common-pool resources is that for natural resources that
generate positive rents over time the cost to excluding potential beneficiaries from obtaining
benefits from use can be high and, hence, open access cannot be restricted. Copeland and Taylor
(2009), however, predict that trade-induced increases in resource prices can lead to a transition
to more effective management regimes of these kind of resources. The reason for this is that
trade-induced increases in the price of the resource raise further the instantaneous rate of rents
(given any stock level) thereby making it easier for some group of countries (either of the ‘Ostrom’
or ‘Clark’ type) to satisfy the incentive constraint. The approach followed here shows that open
access may persist in a variety of settings.
To illustrate the possibilities (and facilitate comparison with Copeland and Taylor, 2009)
suppose that the productivity parameter, q, is smaller than the resource’s intrinsic growth rate, a.
Then, as noted earlier, there is an abundance of resource stock that is capable of regenerating rents
over time. This, as it was argued previously, works in favor of the rational-guided behaviour. But
is it possible that there is institutional change even though there is abundance of the renewable
stock? The answer to this is in the affirmative. Figure 1.1 illustrates the case in which there is
abundance of the renewable stock over time, and the norms are effective, whereas Figure 1.2
illustrates the case where norms are ineffective. A comparison of the two figures reveals that
the long-run value of stock is the same, and that the stock of the renewable resource declines
monotonically until it reaches the steady-state at a level lower than the maximum sustainable yield
level.27 Interestingly, the equilibrium in population composition differs between the two figures.
27 This, of course, depends critically on the parameter values. Notice that Figures 1.1 and 1.2 assume that the initial
resource stock, S0, is at the largest sustainable size, K. For a smaller value of S0 (and with S0 < Smsy) and a higher
ratio of a=q, all other things being equal, the stock will increase at an increasing rate. This, not surprisingly, will not
affect the solution in terms of optimal policy and population composition, since higher stock implies more aggressive
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In Figure 1.1 the proportion of rational-guided workers declines, and (asymptotically) is driven
to zero. Therefore, in the steady-state only the norm-guided workers exist and full compliance
with the regulator results. But the opposite happens in Figure 1.2, where the proportion of
rational-guided workers increases and an equilibrium only with rational-guided workers (and so
open access) prevails.
The open access equilibrium under regulation might appear counterintuitive, as one might
expect that, given partial compliance, a regulator might change the harvesting rule to attain full
compliance and avoid resource depletion. The answer to this rests with the evolution of the
resource rents and optimal harvesting rule. In Figures 1.1 and 1.2 rents decrease monotonically
along the transition path, and the optimal harvesting rule, ln, is always constant and equal to one.
In fact, the regulator is faced with the case where rents are sustained at a positive level (that is, the
maximum ln is optimal) and the upper bound on the state variable nr is violated when ln < 1.
Consequently, the regulator chooses ln = 1 forever and so she chooses full-time employment in
the harvesting sector for all individuals implying that only the informal institutions can affect their
behaviour.28
It is not surprising, in view of the above results, that higher harvesting good prices will not
cause institution change. Clearly, given the other parameters values, a higher price will raise the
instantaneous rate of rents on any stock level and so all individuals will wish to work full-time
in the harvesting sector. The implication of this is that with higher harvesting good prices (e.g.
international) the resource abundant economy will complete specialize in production of the
harvesting good (in the steady-state). This, following Proposition 3, is optimal even if the stock
harvesting. But it will affect the dynamics of resource stock and rents (see Appendix C).
28 Since ln = 1 the replicator dynamics equation in (1.28) is reduced to nrt+1   nrt =  (1  
nrt)nrtfN [   ( + )nrt ]g: Then, the proportion of rational-guided workers decreases if and only
nr < =( + ), or equivalently, if informal institutions are effective. In fact, a higher probability of being caught
(), a higher cost of fines (), a smaller cost of enforcement (), and a smaller initial proportion of rational-guided
workers (nr0) can cease the full compliance equilibrium.
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Figure 1.1: Abundance of stock and effectiveness of norms.
Figure 1.2: Abundance of stock and ineffectiveness of norms.
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may fall to the steady-state (Clark, 1973).29 Informal institutions, once again, determine the
prevailing institution and so a price increase does not rule out the open access equilibrium.30
Lower harvesting good prices will generate a full compliance equilibrium—as shown in Figure
1.3.31 The first point to note is that now a steady-state does not exist. In fact, the resource
transition exhibits non-monotonicity: the resource stock is driven down to a level where the rents
become negative. During this period, the harvesting rule is equal to one. Observe, then, that
the harvesting rule is set equal to zero until the resource stock recovers to the level where rents
become again positive and so the harvesting rule is again equal to one. The transition of the
proportion of rational-guided workers exhibits non-monotonicity, too. As the returns to harvesting
become negative for low levels of the resource stock, the proportion of rational-guided workers
starts to decline rapidly. While the resource stock is allowed to recover (that is, the norm-guided
individuals works only in the manufacturing sector), the proportion of rational-guided workers
starts growing again (but it does so at a slower rate). These dynamics will repeat for some periods
but the rational-guided workers will eventually disappear. The implication of this is that with
sufficiently few rational-guided workers it is costly to behave rationally. Notice, interestingly,
that at some point (at t = 16) the regulator is faced with the case in which the resource rents are
negative, but the non-negativity constraint upon the state variable nr becomes binding for ln = 0.
This forces the regulator to choose a positive harvesting rule which temporarily sacrifices welfare
until full compliance is attained.32 Therefore, lower harvesting good prices (e.g. autarky prices)
29 This implies that the economy will specialize in production of the harvesting good (at least in the short run) .
30 Roumasset and Tarui (2010) focus on the dynamics of institutional change in the presence of state management costs
and trade-induced higher resource prices. They show that open access can be optimal if the resource is in abundance,
and also either the costs of management or the resource prices are high.
31 Figure 1.3 assumes that norms are ineffective. The case where norms are effective exhibits similar dynamics, except
from the fact that it takes shorter time to move to the full compliance equilibrium. The implication of this is that,
lower prices, and in contrast to the case of higher prices, move the population in the direction of full compliance
independently of the effectiveness of norms.
32 Notice that an increase in the wage rate, w, can cause similar effects, to that of lower prices, on behaviour. There is
some simple explanation behind this. An increase in w decreases the net returns from harvesting. This gives rise to
the effects described before: it reduces the gains from behaving rationally and moves the population in the direction
of full compliance. But if norms of ineffective, then the effect of a change in the wage rate depends critically on its
size. The reason for this is that a small increase in the wage rate might not be enough to ‘tip’ the behaviour into the
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Figure 1.3: Abundance of stock and ineffectiveness of norms. The case of lower prices.
will prevent a resource abundant economy to complete specialize in production of the harvesting
good. Instead, it will specialize in production of the harvesting (manufactures) good if rents are
positive (negative) but, interesting, there may be the case where it will be forced to produce both
manufactures and harvesting goods even if resource rents are negative. This case can emerge if
the constraints upon the state variable nr become binding at the optimum.
The above results reveal that moving from autarky to trade with a temporary increase in prices
can cause a breakdown of the norm. The intuition is clear. If, at the current state, the payoffs are
close to each other then a rise in price will result in higher payoffs to the rational strategy with
the consequences detailed above (see also Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). This is in contrast to
Copeland and Taylor (2009): where the Copeland-Taylor model predicts improved management
regimes under trade, the present model would predict worsened management regimes.
full compliance equilibrium (see Appendix C).
27
The main prediction so far is that institutional change may (or may not) occur in societies
with access to a resource that is capable of regenerating positive rents over time. The reason for
this is straightforward: since the constraints upon the state variable S do not become binding,
the optimal policy is to allow all individuals to work full-time in the harvesting sector (and that
satisfies as well the constraints upon the state variable nr) even if the resource stock (and rents)
will decline at the steady-state. By allowing the norm-guided individuals to work full-time in
harvesting, the payoff differential between the strategies depends on the effectiveness of norms.
Accordingly, institutional change will occur only if it is consistent with the behaviour rules in the
population. Indeed, Taylor (2011) shows that the combination of innovations, fixed world prices,
and open access to the herds were jointly necessary and sufficient for the buffalo collapse in the
North America, a geographical area that was famously described as the ‘black robe of buffalo’.
Taylor’s (2011) argument is that under these ‘favorable’ conditions the incentive to hunt cannot be
reduced. He, however, does not derive any clear conclusion of the political inaction. Historical
documents, however, have emphasized the role of hunters’ opportunistic behaviour in the absence
of regulation.33 Carlos and Lewis (1993) provide a similar example with the Canadian beaver
population which was subject to increased pressure by Indians as a response to the higher fur
prices. Indeed, cultural and social forces here work in opposite direction: they reduced the ability
of Native groups to conserve the resource base. Contrary to the above evidence, there are however
countries that regulate the resources well. For example, the northern fur seal on the Pribilof
islands in Alaska, or the rock lobster in New Zealand. In terms of our model, the above cases
illustrate that the socio-economic context influences which norm will be followed in the long-run.
1.4.2 Scarcity of renewable resource stock
Are low value renewable resources threatened with extinction because there is not enough
33 As Taylor (2011, p.28) notes: ‘The difficulty will be to secure its enforcement, as the extermination of these animals,
which is now impending, is brought about by parties who, at a distance from any control, are a law unto themselves,
and who are not likely to be influenced by any enactments that do not involve the means of execution.’
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incentive for protection? This is now the question we turn to. Arguably, as one might expect (and
this will be consistent with Copeland and Taylor’s, 2009, prediction that resources not capable to
sustain positive rents remain always under open access) this will be the case as the opportunity
cost of protecting such a resource is high relative to the benefits generated by the more efficient
exploitation. But, interestingly, this prediction is not entirely correct if individuals’ behaviour
changes as resource scarcity change over time and the resource is threaten by extinction—as
Figure 1.4 illustrates.
Figure 1.4 assumes that the harvesting productivity parameter, q, is higher than the resource
intrinsic growth rate, a. Under this condition, the replenishment rate is negative and the resource
stock exhibits a non-monotonic path: the stock declines rapidly to a level where rents become
negative. Thereafter, the resource reduces to its limits and then increases until a level where
rents become again positive. The proportion of rational-guided workers declines rapidly and it
eventually becomes zero.34 The intuition behind this optimal approach goes as follows. For some
(short time) interval, the regulator allows all individuals to work full-time in the harvesting sector
by setting ln = 1. This is a consequence of the fact that the upper bound constraint on nr is
binding. It is, however, binding as long as the stock level is high. The ‘overuse’ of the resource
and the productive technology quickly dissipate any rents. Interestingly, at some point (at t = 10)
the regulator is faced with the case where the resource rents are negative, but the non-negativity
constraint upon the state variable nr becomes binding at the optimum, i.e. ln = 0:35 Thereafter,
the regulator can credibly bar harvesting by setting ln = 0, not allowing the resource stock to drop
below zero. The rational-guided workers incur a loss, and they rapidly switch to the norm-guided
behaviour. The stock then starts to increase as do the rents from harvesting. Indeed, once the
34 The case where norms are effective exhibits similar dynamics except from the fact that it takes a shorter time to move
to the full compliance equilibrium. In particular, the full compliance equilibrium with ineffective norms is attained at
t = 10 while with effective norms at t = 7.
35 In terms of primitives, the optimal harvesting rule, ln, is given by the lower bound of (A.6).
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Figure 1.4: Scarcity of stock and ineffectiveness of norms.
harvest is totally controlled (in the sense that everyone follows the rules) the optimal harvesting
rule is set according to the sign of rents.36;37
In the above example, the regulator can achieve full compliance by allowing the resource to
be depleted but without exhausting it. But it is also possible that no regulatory policy is feasible
and, hence, a scarce resource is driven to extinction. The intuition behind this possibility goes as
follows. If the harvesting technology is productive (high q), the gains from the rational-guided
behaviour are relative high as long as the level of the resource stock is still high. The regulator
has no other way of offsetting this advantage except from allowing the resource degradation to
take place. The resource rents will decline but the proportion of rational-guided workers might
36 It is interesting to note that the period during which society needs to forgo harvesting will be shorter for higher
ratio a=q, since the resource will then recover faster. In addition, if the initial resource stock is in the demographic
interval 0 < S < Smsy , it will decline less rapidly. Consequently, it will take longer time to reduce the proportion of
rational-guided workers to zero.
37 At this point, it is important to emphasize that as long as full compliance is attained, the regulator may want to restrict
harvesting until the resource stock reaches the maximum sustainable yield level improving with that way the low rent
equilibria. But this issue is not considered here.
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decline at a slower rate than the stock. The regulator then is faced with negative resource rents
and with the non-negativity constraint upon the state variable nr being binding for ln = 0. This
suggests that she has to adjust ln in order to satisfy the constraint on nr, something that cannot
be achieved. The implication of this is that the resource collapses before the level of harvesting
is controlled. This scenario is possible if the initial resource stock and the initial proportion
of rational-guided workers are sufficiently high. Yet, high harvesting good prices or low wage
rates can delay the resource rent dissipation and so the extinction of the rational-guided workers.
What this all means is that societies with scarcity of resource stock have two possibilities: either
institutional change will occur—with basic elements being the existence of a centralized authority
who carefully determines the conditions under which the harvesting is allowed, and, an initial
population who will certainly follow the rules—or the problem will not have a solution. In the
former case, a resource scarce economy will, in general, specialize in the production of harvesting
(manufactures) good if rents are positive (negative). But in the latter case the harvesting sector
will close down and thereby it will complete specialize in the production of manufactures goods.
In fact, higher harvesting good prices (e.g. international) would make this solution more possible.
Ostrom (1990) provides many examples of successful management of commons where the
resource stock was never in abundance. This type of resources, such as the low-water conditions
in Valencia, are associated with potential conflict-resolution mechanisms. This conflict motivated
appropriators and local authorities to develop a system of complex rules: a set of informal rules
to maintain conformance rates high, and a set of formal rules to precisely define the extraction of
resource units.
The success of the management regime considered here clearly hinges on whether the resource
is scarce or abundant which in turn determines the evolution of gains from behaving rationally.38
38 This, of course, holds as long as the costs related to the self-enforcement mechanism are small relative to the initial
harvesting gains (which seems to us as a realistic assumption). Yet, it should be noted that endogenous changes in
prices and wage rates might generate different dynamics. Variations of the model incorporating these issues would
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The explanation behind this is as follows. Overexploitation of resources does not necessarily
relax the constraints on rational behaviour. If rational behaviour is well-established in the first
place, there are always economic gains to be obtained from such behaviour. In other words, it will
be difficult for a regulator to create incentives for compliance while individuals feel (morally)
against complying. But this does not have to happen when resources are scarce. Scarcity of
resources can engage individuals in a trial-and-error process that would result in a commonly
accepted compliance behaviour, as a way of economic survival. But without the existence of a
regulatory mechanism a miscalculation of the error may be disastrous as it can bring the stock size
to depletion.
1.5 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a simple dynamic model of common renewable
resources management where formal centralized and individual decisions interact to form an
institution: this management is based on a centralized mechanism that works together with a
self-enforcement one that is guided by social norms. This particular management has been
motivated by the fact that although individuals can monitor each other’s behaviour (an incentive
arising from the benefits of monitoring which punishes misbehaviour), it might take some time
before one could observe the effects of such behaviour on the resource stock.
Two possible institutional equilibria were examined: (i) a norm-guided equilibrium in which
full compliance with the rules, formal and informal, is attained, and (ii) a rational-guided
equilibrium in which no one follows the rules, formal and informal, and open access results. It has
been shown that two forces determine the prevailing institution: resource stock availability and
effectiveness of social norms. If there is resource stock abundance, both equilibria are possible
depending on the effectiveness of norms. In contrast, if there is resource stock scarcity, the only
equilibrium that exists is the norm-guided one. Exogenous changes in harvesting goods prices and
clearly be an interesting avenue for future research.
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wage rates can have different effects in abundant versus scarce resources. The results could thus
provide a theoretical explanation for the evidence of why economies with abundance of resource
stock may not improve their institutions while others with scarcity of resource stock may do so.
The policy implication that can be drawn from this model is that any intervention should reflect
the particular socio-economic and resource structures of the given economy.
Our model focuses on renewable resources management. Exhaustible resources (oil, minerals,
etc.) can provide another example of the same problem: we would be concerned with the
achievement of an efficient allocation between competing users at different dates that substantially
depends on the given institutional structure. Analyzing however the dynamics of an economy
with exhaustible resources requires different considerations as their exploitation tends to zero in
the long run. Extending the model to allow the pressure of extinction to influence centralized
and individual decisions would be a valuable extension. In addition, the model enables us to
distinguish ecological, institutional and socio-economic determinants of compliance. It would be
interesting to see the extent to which the empirical evidence is consistent with these theoretical
predictions.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
We first define the set of all lnt that satisfies (1.33) or, equivalently, that 0  nrt+1  1. There
are two cases to consider.
Case 1 nrt+1  0:
Following from (1.28), nrt+1  0 requires that
[(1  nrt)f(pqSt   2w)(1  lnt)  N [   ( + )nrt ]g+ 1]nrt  0: (A.1)
Clearly, if either nrt = 0 or nrt = 1 then (A.1) is satisfied for
0  lnt  1: (A.2)
If now nrt 2 (0; 1)—dividing (A.1) through by nrt and that by (1   nrt) and rearranging—one
obtains
lnt(pqSt   2w)  (pqSt   2w)  N [   ( + )nrt ] +
1
(1  nrt)
: (A.3)
Three possibilities now emerge.
(a) If pqSt   2w > 0 (and dividing both sides of (A.3) by this) (A.3) becomes
lnt  1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w ;
and thus the admissible lnt is given by
0  lnt  min
(
1; 1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w
)
: (A.4)
(b) If pqSt   2w < 0, and following the same steps as for (A.4), the admissible lnt is
determined by
lnt  1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w : (A.5)
Clearly, if 1=(1   nrt)   N [   ( + )nrt ] < 0 then lnt > 1 which is not admissible. But if
1=(1  nrt)  N [   ( + )nrt ] > 0 the admissible lnt is defined by
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1  lnt  1 +
1
(1 nrt )   N [   ( + )nrt ]
pqSt   2w : (A.6)
(c) If pqSt   2w = 0 then (A.3) reduces to
0  1
(1  nrt)
  N [   ( + )nrt ] : (A.7)
In this case, if 1  (1  nrt)N [   ( + )nrt ], then lnt must satisfy
0  lnt  1: (A.8)
If, one the other hand, 1 < (1   nrt)N [   ( + )nrt ] then, following from (A.1), the set
A(S; nr) is empty.
Case 2 nrt+1  1:
Following from (1.28), nrt+1  1 requires that
[(1  nrt)f(pqSt   2w)(1  lnt)  N [   ( + )nrt ]g+ 1]nrt  1: (A.9)
Clearly, if nrt = 0 then nrt+1 = 0, and if nrt = 1 then nrt+1 = 1. In this case admissible solution
is
0  lnt  1: (A.10)
If now nrt 2 (0; 1)—dividing (A.9) through by nrt and that by (1   nrt) and rearranging—one
obtains
(pqSt   2w)  N [   ( + )nrt ] 
1
nrt
 (pqSt   2w)lnt : (A.11)
There are three possibilities:
(a) If pqSt   2w > 0, dividing both sides of (A.11) by this, gives
lnt  1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w : (A.12)
If N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1=nrt < 0 then lnt > 1 and, hence, the set A(S; nr) is empty. If, on the
other hand, N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1=nrt  0 it must hold
1  lnt  1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w : (A.13)
(b) If pqSt   2w < 0, dividing both sides of (A.11) by this, gives
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lnt  1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w ; (A.14)
and thus
0  lnt  min
(
1; 1 
N [   ( + )nrt ] + 1nrt
pqSt   2w
)
: (A.15)
(c) If pqSt   2w = 0, then (A.11) becomes
 N [   ( + )nrt ] 
1
nrt
 0: (A.16)
Clearly, if  N [   ( + )nrt ] > 1=nrt it violates (A.11) and so the set A(S; nr) is empty. If,
on the other hand,  N [   ( + )nrt ]  1=nrt then there is no constraints for lnt and so
0  lnt  1: (A.17)
Summarizing the above results, we have that lnt 2 [L1(St; nrt); L2(St; nrt)] where L1 and L2 as
stated in Lemma 1.

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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2
The next step is to investigate the set of feasible lnt that satisfies (1.34) or, equivalently, that
0  St+1  K. Two cases emerge.
Case 1 St+1  0:
Following from (1.29), St+1  0 requires that
aSt(1  St=K) + [1  qNnrt   (1  nrt)lnt ]St  0: (B.1)
Clearly, St = 0 we have St+1 = 0 so for all T  t there is no more stock left and the harvesting
sector is closing down. If, on the other hand, St > 0 then (B.1) reduces to
lnt 
1  qNnrt + aSt(1  St=K)
1  nrt
; (B.2)
and so
0  lnt  min

1;
1  qNnrt + aSt(1  St=K)
1  nrt
:

(B.3)
Case 2 St+1  K:
Following from (1.29) St+1  K requires that
aSt

1  St
K

+ [1  qNnrt   (1  nrt)lnt ]St  K: (B.4)
Dividing both sides of (B.4) by St gives
lnt 
a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St
1  nrt
: (B.5)
It is, therefore, immediate that
a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St
1  nrt
 lnt  1: (B.6)
There are now two possibilities. If [a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St] = (1  nrt) > 1 then
the set B(S; nr) is empty. But if [a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St] = (1  nrt)  1 then the
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admissible solution must satisfy
a(1  St=K) + 1  qNnrt  K=St
1  nrt
 lnt  1: (B.7)
Summarizing the above results, we have that lnt 2 [L3(St; nrt); L4(St; nrt)] where L3 and L4 as
stated in Lemma 2.

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Appendix C
The case of S0 < K=2 and higher ratio a=q
Figure C.1: Abundance of stock and effectiveness of norms.
Figure C.2: Abundance of stock and ineffectiveness of norms.
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Abundance of stock and ineffectiveness of norms. The case of higher wage rates, w
Figure C.3: The case of higher wage rates.
Figure C.4: The case of further higher wage rates.
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Chapter 2 Trade, management of Commons, and the role of technologies in alternative
industries
2.1 Introduction
International trade affects the production, consumption and transportation of natural resources
and it may, therefore, have detrimental effects on the resource systems.1 Given pre-existing
distortions on the resource management, the impact of international trade on the resource
conservation and welfare is an issue that, arguably, requires attention.2
Early theoretical work has recognized the problem of ‘open access’—meaning a situation
where common ownership and access to a renewable resource will lead to its overexploitation,
and even to its extinction3—and more recently the literature has paid particular attention to the
effects of international trade under open access resource conditions. Brander and Taylor (1997)
use a standard Ricardian model of international trade to analyze the effects of trade for a small
open economy that exports a renewable resource. The main result of that work is that trade will
lead to a welfare loss if the country has comparative advantage in the resource sector and does
not fully specialize in that sector. The underlying assumption behind this result is that the level
of resource stock cannot sustain the entire labor force entering the resource sector after opening
up for trade. In this case—following Brander and Taylor’s argument—the country will loss its
initial comparative advantage and end-up importing the resource good unless a more efficient
resource management regime emerges. Hannesson (2000), extending Brander and Taylor (1997)
1 According to the World Trade Organization report in 2010, the value of world exports of natural resources increased
more than sixfold between 1998 and 2008, rising from US$ 613 billion to US$ 3.7 trillion. In particular for the issues
in this chapter the value of global fish exports rose from US$ 53 billion in 1998 to US$ 98 billion in 2008, while
exports of forestry products increased from US$ 52 billion to US$ 106 billion.
2 For an insightful survey on the issue see Bulte and Barbier (2005).
3 For early contributions on the issue of open access in fisheries see, among others, Gordon (1954), Scott (1955), Smith
(1969), Clark (1973, 1979).
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to diminishing returns in the other goods sector, demonstrates that opening up for trade might
result in gains from trade, even if there is open access to the resource. Indeed, he shows that
moving from open access to optimal resource management regimes may not improve welfare
unless there are terms of trade effects from the management of the resource. This result is
known in the literature as ‘immiserizing management’.4 Chichilnisky (1994) employs a standard
Hecksher-Ohlin model to consider the trade between countries that differ only in terms of their
institutional context. In particular, the ‘North’ is assumed to have perfect property rights while
the ‘South’ has none. The resource good is an input which together with another factor (labor or
capital) are used to produce two goods, say A and B, with good B being more resource-intensive
than good A. She shows that the South without property rights will be the exporter of the
resource-intensive good and, as a consequence, its stock and welfare will decline. The opposite is
true for the North.
While the above approach (and results) provides us with a number of insights, the assumption
of a exogenous property rights regimes is, arguably, restrictive (Demsetz, 1967).5 Similarly, the
role of individuals’ characteristics in shaping institutional regimes has not received the attention it
deserves. This chapter attempts to address both of these issues.
The endogeneity of institutions has been recognised in earlier work. De Meza and Gould
(1992) within a general equilibrium framework analyze the private decentralized decision to
establish the socially optimal level of enforcement. They conclude that property rights are
enforced if the rents generated by a more efficient exploitation exceed the enforcement costs.
4 The negative effect of management on a closed economy’s welfare was early recognized by Weitzman (1974). The
main result of this important work is that under an efficient allocation of labor, society can inflict welfare loss as a
consequence of the decrease in the labor reward.
5 Demsetz (1967), in his early approach to the problem of common property rights, has emphasized that new property
rights can emerge whenever the transacting cost is smaller than the expected gains. Therefore, as Demsetz argued,
changes in technologies and prices that increase the expected gains would improve the property rights regimes.
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Hotte et al. (2000) find, too, that private decentralized decision to enforce property rights depends
on their relative costs and benefits. Their analysis then continuous to the case in which the
economy is opened to trade, showing that opening up for trade with enforced property rights may
lead to a deterioration in welfare if the wage rate falls. (This is therefore another example where
trade can have immiserizing effects.) Roumasset and Tarui (2010) focus on the transition path to
the steady-state to identify how the decision of the resource management changes in the presence
of management costs. In the presence of costly management and zero fixed cost, they find that
management will optimally start as resource stock is depleted to its steady-state level. However,
if the institutional change also requires a positive fixed cost, they suggest that open access is
optimal until the resource stock falls below its steady-state level. Yet the authors estimate the
optimal timing of management showing that it is delayed whenever the resource price is high
or the cost of management is large. That is, the optimal property rights regime would be open
access even the economy is opened to trade. Tajibaeva (2012) develops a model to analyze the
economic growth of an open resource-based economy and evaluates numerically the transition
path and the steady-state. She finds that property rights will improve when the economy exports
the resource good with favorable terms of trade. Tajibaeva argues that renewable resources have a
positive impact on economic growth for an open economy under the condition that institutions are
well-defined.6
The general lesson from the above results is that a given economy may or may not change
its institutional regimes after opening up for trade.7 A question that, naturally, arises is what
6 This result contradicts Matsuyama’s (1992). Using an endogenous growth model with spillover effects in
manufacturing sector, Matsuyama has argued that trade-induced reallocation of labor from the manufacturing sector
to the resource sector will result in the economy’s de-industrialization over time. And, as the reasoning of this
suggests, trade might reduce welfare. This is an explanation of the so-called ‘resource curse’ effect.
7 The transition to a better management of the geoduck fishery stock in British Columbia after trading with Asia, on
one hand, and the buffalo collapse in the US plains after the increase in European demand (Taylor, 2007), on the
other, seems to support the idea that the effects of trade on a given institutional structure are mixed.
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determines an open economy’s institutional arrangements? Recently, Copeland and Taylor (2009)
develop an endogenous resource management model that incorporates both internal and external
forces to explain why some economies succeed in the resource management and some others
fail. When discussing the impacts of trade openness, they predict that for low resource prices
‘all countries exhibit de facto open access’ while for higher resource prices ‘some countries
[exhibit] limited management, and some perfect property rights protection’ (p.737). Yet they also
predict that some resource-exporting economies ‘will always experience resource depletion and a
steady-state real income reduction’ (p.738).
These results are, however, derived by assuming that there are constant returns to scale in the
production of the other goods. The objective of this chapter is, first, to relax this assumption
(in the context of Copeland and Taylor, 2009) and introduce increasing returns to scale. It is
shown that if there are increasing returns in the production of other goods some countries might
enforce property rights for low (autarky) resource prices and exhibit open access for higher
(international) resource prices. Additionally, if there are increasing returns, opening up for trade
might interestingly, result in welfare gains even when there is open access. The idea behind
this result is that an exogenous increase in resource productivity shifts labor to the alternative
sector and thereby make it possible for an economy to achieve higher welfare. We thus provide
a positive link between trade openness and increasing returns technologies in alternative sources
of income and suggest this link as a precondiction to avoid the poor economic performance and
overexploitation of natural resources. Second, Copeland and Taylor’s model does not allow
for heterogenous harvesters’ behaviour, nor does consider the role of informal institutions in
resolving collective action problems.8 This chapter also demonstrates the possibility of an
8 See Sethi and Somanathan (1996) who consider the possibility of a decentralized management based on social norms
to analyse the equilibrium outcome of an evolutionary process that could lead to cooperation.
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informal formation to influence individuals’ incentive to comply (or not) with regulation showing
that trade liberalization may lead to worsen management regimes.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces a general model to provide the
essential structure of the problem of ‘commons’. Section 2.3 sets up the model of a common
renewable resource management and links the prevailing management regimes to country
characteristics, trade liberalization, and technologies in the outside industry. Section 2.4 extends
the analysis to the case of heterogeneous individuals or stricter punishments. Finally, Section 2.5
briefly concludes.
2.2 The problem of ‘commons’
We begin with the description of the problem by adapting a static model of commons as an
n-person game (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, Chapter 3).9 Consider a fixed number N (indexed
by i = 1; :::; N) of identical individuals who have rights of access and extraction of a common
resource. The labor/effort expended on the resource extraction per unit of time by individual i is
denoted by li. The aggregate extraction effort—denoted by L—is the sum of the all individuals’
effort and it is given by
L =
NX
i=1
li: (2.1)
The available resource stock is denoted by S. The aggregate harvest—denoted by H—is a
function of the aggregate labor L and the available resource stock S that is, H(L; S). It is
assumed, for simplicity, that S is fixed in size and is denoted by S = S. Since S is an exogenously
given constant, it can be normalized and set S equal to unity and so
H(L; 1) = H(L): (2.2)
It is assumed that H(0) = 0, H 0(L) > 0, H 00(L) < 0, and that H(L) is bounded from above
9 This model is employed only for the purposes of this section.
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implying that
H(L)
L
> H 0(L) and lim
l!1
H(L)
L
= 0: (2.3)
With the average product decreasing in the aggregate labor, the harvest accruing to individual
i is dependent both on her effort and the effort expended by the other individuals. Given that
individuals are identical, the share of the aggregate harvest obtained by individual i is proportional
to the average that is, liH(L)=L. Denote by hi the individual i’s harvest, it is the case that
hi  liH(LN i + li)
LN i + li
; (2.4)
with L
N i 
NP
j=1
j 6=i
li. Notice that, for any given level of labor li, less harvest will be obtained by
individual i if another individual’s effort, say j’s (with j = 1; :::; N and lj 6=i) is positive. In this
case, a detrimental externality is generated that, as it is shown shortly below, will lead to a Pareto
inefficient allocation of individuals’ effort.10
Individuals are profit maximizers and the market of the resource good is perfectly competitive.
Let p be the price of the resource good (and for simplicity and without loss of generality it is
normalized to one) and w be the cost of labor. An individual i with labor (effort) li—assuming
that all other individuals will expend effort bl—maximizes the net profit (or rents) given by
i =
liHf(N   1)bl + lig
(N   1)bl + li   wli; (2.5)
with necessary condition
(N   1)blHf(N   1)bl + lig
f(N   1)bl + lig2 + liH
0f(N   1)bl + lig
(N   1)bl + li = w: (2.6)
Under free access (2.6) will hold for all individuals and by symmetry li = bl for all i: Hence, the
equilibrium individual effort bl is the solution to the equation
H(Nl)
Nl
  1
N

H(Nl)
Nl
 H 0(Nl)

= w; (2.7)
10 See also Baumol and Oates (1988)—and, in particular, Chapter 8.
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or, equivalently,
H(L)
L
  w = 1
N

H(L)
L
 H 0(L)

: (2.8)
It follows that each individual expends her effort to the point where the extra rent H(L)
L
  w of an
additional unit of effort is equalized to the loss 1
N
n
H(L)
L
 H 0(L)
o
from reduction in the average
product of labor. Notice however that the fall in average product is less that the loss in the group
as a whole and, hence, the externality is not fully internalized. Denote the solution to equation
(2.8) by LN = NlN .
For later use—following from (2.3) and (2.8)—one arrives at
w  H 0(LN) = (N   1)
N

H(LN)
LN
 H 0(LN)

> 0: (2.9)
We turn now to the (symmetric) efficient allocation. The problem in this case is to maximize total
net profit—denoted by —given by11
 = H(Nl)  wNl; (2.10)
with necessary condition
H 0(Nl) = w or H 0(L) = w: (2.11)
Pareto efficiency (as one would expect), therefore, dictates that the value of marginal product of
labor should be equal to the wage rate. Denote the solution to equation (2.11) by LE = NlE:
Close observation of (2.9) and (2.11) reveals that under the free access equilibrium the marginal
product of labor is less than the wage rate by the amount (N 1)
N
n
H(LN )
LN
 H 0(LN)
o
implying
that
LE < LN or lE < lN ; (2.12)
and so each individual will put in more effort, than is efficient, resulting in the overexploitation of
the common resource. Nevertheless, following from (2.9), there are positive rents in equilibrium.
11 One can also consider this problem as one in which the resource is owned by one agent (i.e. N = 1) who determines
the allocation of labor (see, for example, De Meza and Gould (1992) and Hotte et al. (2000)) .
49
But rents will remain positive only if N is fixed. Without limit to access, and as long as positive
rents exist, a ‘large’ number of individuals will enter the resource. This can be seen by implicitly
differentiating (2.8)—treating N  1 as a continuous variable—to obtain
@L
@N
=
H(L)
N2 (w  H 0(L)) > 0: (2.13)
Actually, as N !1 then (2.8) is reduced to
H(L)
L
= w; (2.14)
which implies that there are no rents to be obtained by individual: open access results . Denote
the solution to equation (2.14) by LO = NlO. To summarize the above discussion:
Proposition 4 The free access equilibrium is inefficient and is associated with overexploitation
of the resource. More precisely, LE < LN < LO (or lE < lN < lO) and H(L)=L   w > 0 for
some L < LO (or l < lO) that is, there are positive rents in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 shows that under common property there is overexploitation of resource and
thereby rents can be driven to zero. Even though each individual would be better off if they all
agreed to restrict their effort, each individual would prefer to free-ride on the effort of others. In
this case, there is a need for the design of an appropriate regulatory mechanism to limit entry and
avoid rent dissipation. And this is the objective of this paper.
More specifically, in this chapter we consider a manager who sets upper limits on the
individuals’ degree of exploitation and monitors them to ensure that no one misbehaves
(‘cheats’). But given that the manager has imperfect information the analysis takes the form of a
principle-agent (incentive) problem. Then, the question is whether it is credible for the manager
to impose constraints on the resource use. This is to what we now turn.
2.3 A model of common property resources management
The framework is that of Copeland and Taylor (2009), extended to allow for all possible
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technologies in outside of the resource sector. Consider a resource-rich small open economy
populated by N (fixed in the steady-state) identical agents.12 All agents are endowed with one unit
of labor, l, per unit of time that can be allocated to harvest the resource or work for manufacturing.
The manager sets harvesting rules to maximize a utilitarial objective function recognizing agents’
incentive to depart from following the efficient choice of labor.
2.3.1 Technologies and endowments
The economy consists of two sectors: a manufacturing sector and a renewable resource sector.
The resource sector uses labor, Lh, to harvest the resource.13 Let S denote the available resource
stock that changes at the rate (time arguments are omitted for convenience)
_S  dS
dt
= G(S) H(Lh; S); (2.15)
where H(Lh; S) is the harvest rate and G(S) is the natural resource growth. The growth function
is assumed to be logistic and given by
G(S) = rS(1  S=K); (2.16)
with G(0) = G(Smax) = 0, G0(Smsy) = 0 and G00(S) < 0 for 0  S  Smax. Smax denotes the
maximum self-sustaining population size, and Smsy the population size producing the maximum
sustainable yield. r > 0 is the intrinsic rate of resource growth, and K is the carrying capacity of
the resource stock.
The harvest rate is given by
H(Lh; S) = aLhS; (2.17)
where a > 0 (a constant) is a productivity parameter which expresses how effective the effort is
relative to a given resource stock.
12 The underlying assumption here is that at each instant in time the rate of births is equal to the rate of deaths and so the
steady-state population N is fixed.
13 It is assumed that labor is homogenous and so can move freely across the sectors.
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The manufacturing sector uses labor, Lm, to produce a good, M . M is the numeraire good with
its price set to unity. The production function for M is given by
M = F (Lm); (2.18)
with F 0 > 0. The manufacturing sector is assumed to be competitive implying that
F 0(Lm) = w; (2.19)
where w is the equilibrium wage rate and so is endogenously determined.
In a steady-state dS=dt = 0. Substituting (2.16) and (2.17) into (2.15) and setting that equal to
zero gives
aLhS = rS(1  S=K); (2.20)
and so the steady-state resource stock is given by
S = K

1  aLh
r

: (2.21)
Substituting (2.21) into (2.17) gives the steady-state harvest as
H = aLhK

1  aLh
r

: (2.22)
Close inspection of (2.21) reveals that if the labor allocation Lh is sufficiently high (Lh > ra)
the resource, at the steady-state, will be extinguished. The implication of this—following from
(2.22)—is that harvesting will be zero.
Finally, there is full employment and so
N = Lh + Lm: (2.23)
2.3.2 Agents
Agents consume two goods, the harvest from the resource, H , and the manufacturing good, M .
Denote by U(R(; t)) the instantaneous utility from consumption when an agent of vintage v at
time t has real income of R(v; t).14 The expected present discounted value of lifetime utility for a
14 The underlying assumption here is that tastes are homothetic so indirect utility can be expressed as a function of the
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representative agent of vintage  is
W () =
Z 1

U(R(; t))e (+)(t )dt; (2.24)
where  is the pure rate of time preference, and  is the instantaneous probability of death.15 Thus,
agents of vintage v compute their lifetime expected utility—as measured from the moment of
birth over the remainder of their lifetimes—taking into account the probability of not being alive
at some future time interval. Therefore, the more likely it is agents to die (high ), the higher they
discount the future (high ) placing more weight on the current utility (when being alive). The
implication of this is that agents are more likely to cheat on the efficient allocation.
Agents’ earned rents per unit of labor in the resource sector are given by16
 = paS   w; (2.25)
where w represents the opportunity cost of labor in the resource sector. This alternative source of
income determines how attractive is the resource sector. In fact, at any given resource stock S and
harvesting productivity a, the wage rate w together with the price of the resource p will determine
the agents’ opportunity sets and, hence, how much ‘excessive’ capacity will need to be excluded
from the resource sector.
We assume that at time t = 0 the aggregate exploitation level satisfies Lh < LO. Hence, by
Proposition 4, rents are currently positive i.e.  > 0. This implies that the income per unit of labor
from harvesting is greater than that from working in the manufacturing sector and thereby new
real income.
15 The memoryless feature of the exponential distribution of the death rate implies that all agents alive at a point in time
have the same probability of dying over any future time interval. For instance, if N(t) agents of vintage v are alive at
time t, then, only N(t)e ( v) of them will be alive at time t+  , with   0:
16 Notice that the rent function in (2.25) differs from that in (2.5). To see this in a clear way suppose that p = 1 and
rewrite (2.25) as li (H(Nli)Nli  w) which differs from (2.5). Then, instead of equation (2.8), the symmetric equilibrium
condition will read as H(Nli)Nli = w which implies zero rents. The intuition behind this outcome is the following. As
long as Nli is fixed each individual takes into account the effects of her effort on the average product and positive
rents are made. Therefore, with free entry, Nli will increase. Each individual will then behave as if her effort cannot
influence the average product and therefore labor would increase until the average product equals the wage rate, as it
is the situation analyzed here.
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agents will enter to the resource. In fact, all agents would like to work full-time in the resource
sector. But agents are authorized to spend a fixed amount in the resource. Denote this allocation
as l  1.
Agents have therefore to decide whether to behave in accordance with the rules or cheat,
allocating all their labor harvesting the resource. The trade off that an agent makes is
straightforward: adhere to the rules and earn some income from harvesting, paSl, and some from
manufacturing, w(1   l) or, alternatively, she can take the risk and cheat spending all her time
in the resource sector earning income paS. But if too much time is spent in the resource sector
she seriously runs the risk of being detected at a rate dt. In this case, she is liable to a fine,
F . The manager is assumed to have limited liability. In particular, the maximum fine that the
manager can impose on a detected agent is for that agent to lose access to the resource and work
in the manufacturing sector henceforth. To put it differently, the fine for the agent is to lose the
opportunity of earning income from both sectors forever and, hence, an agent’s income can never
be zero.17
In principle, an agent’s optimal choice depends on comparing the expected income of cheating
with that of non cheating.18 Denote by V NC(t) the expected income stream of an agent who is not
cheating, V C(t) the expected income stream of an agent who is cheating, and V R(t) the maximum
over these two options, that is
V R(t) = max

V NC(t); V C(t)

: (2.26)
Finally, denote by V M(t) the expected income stream of an agent who currently works only in the
manufacturing sector.
17 Section 2.4.2 discusses the case of stricter fines.
18 Agents’ heterogenous rule-following decision is postponed until Section 2.4.1.
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The discounted benefits of cheating in the current period are defined as19
V C(t) = paSdt+ [1  dt][1  dt][dt[V R(t+ dt) F (t+ dt)] + [1  dt]V R(t+ dt)]: (2.27)
Similarly, the discounted benefits of not cheating in the current period are defined as
V NC(t) = [paSl + (1  l)w]dt+ [1  dt][1  dt][V R(t+ dt)]: (2.28)
Notice that all agents can have the same set of options for the future. Those who cheat and are not
been caught have the some options with those who have complied with the rules, and vice versa.
Obviously, an agent will choose not to cheat if and only if V NC  V C . Expanding (2.27) and
(2.28)—upon making use of T (t + dt) t T (t) + _T (t)dt, cancelling dt terms and letting dt go to
zero—one can write (2.26) as20
V R(t) = max
"
paSl + (1  l)w + _V R
 + 
;
paS   F (t) + _V R
 + 
#
: (2.29)
Accordingly, an agent will choose not to cheat if and only if
paSl + (1  l)w + _V R
 + 
> paS   F (t) +
_V R
 + 
; (2.30)
which after some straightforward manipulations, becomes
F (t)  (paS   w)(1  l): (2.31)
The inequality in (2.31) simply says that if the cost of being punished with probability  is higher
than the rents earned by the additional time spending in harvesting, 1  l, then agents will comply
with the regulation.
The fine for a detected agent, as noted earlier, is to lose the opportunity to earn income
from both sectors and earn income only from manufacturing henceforth. We can then write
F (t) = [V R(t)  V M(t)] or, equivalently,
F (t) =
l(paS   w) + _V R   _M
 + 
: (2.32)
19 In (2.27) and (2.28) we have made use of the fact that expf itg t 1  it for t small.
20 For a derivation of (2.29) see as example Appendix F. See also Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Copeland and Taylor
(2004).
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The structure of fine works as a gradual deterrent mechanism. Actually, the value of losing access
to the resource sector rises with the resource rents as cheating becomes more attractive, and vice
versa. Additionally, the fine is larger when agents are impatient that is, when more weight is
attached to the short-run gains from cheating.
Substituting (2.32) into (2.31) and evaluating that in the steady-state, gives
l(paS   w)   + 
+  + 
(paS   w): (2.33)
Close inspection of (2.33) reveals that the incentive constraint can be met in two ways depending
on the sign of the resource rents (paS   w): First, if the resource rents are positive then (2.33)
becomes
l   + 
+  + 
; (2.34)
which upon making use of Lh = Nl, can be rewritten as
Lh
N
  + 
+  + 
: (2.35)
Therefore, if the resource rents are positive the individual effort in harvesting should exceed a
threshold level that is, determined by parameters reflecting the agents’ patience ( + ) and the
probability of detection (). Rearranging (2.35) and using (2.21), one obtains
LTh =
 + 
+  + 
N; ST = K

1  aL
T
h
r

; (2.36)
with LTh denoting the aggregate amount of time that agents must be allowed to harvest when rents
are positive, and ST its associated resource stock. Notice, for later use, that LTh is decreasing in
the probability of detection and increasing in the number of impatience agents. Thus LTh depends
only upon internal country characteristics.
The second possibility to meet the incentive constraint is when resource rents are zero. To
determine this level of effort, LOh , and its associated resource stock, SO, set paS = w and
56
substitute S into (2.21) to obtain
LOh =
r
a

1  w
paK

; SO = K

1  aL
O
h
r

: (2.37)
Note, in particular, that the level of labor LOh is increasing in the resource price p and decreasing
in the wage rate w. It then follows that the resource stock SO is decreasing in the resource price
and increasing in the wage rate. The opposite effects of p and w on the level of LOh indicate that
LOh can be large even if the resource price is high, on one hand, and that LOh can be small even if
the resource price is low, on the other. This, as it will shown shortly, creates a critical dissimilarity
between constant and endogenous wage rate, one which is at the heart of the present analysis.
Therefore, in contrast with the allocation LTh , the allocation LOh can be affected by trade through
changes in p and w. This difference plays an important role in the analysis of the prevailing
regimes and is discussed further below.
Obviously, if the resource rents are negative the agents will move to the manufacturing sector
to earn a higher income. Whether this reallocation process of labor between the two sectors is
permanent, or temporary—i.e. whether (or not) the economy will completely specialize in the
manufacturing sector—depends on the characteristics of manufacturing technologies and the
availability of resource stock. We turn to this later on.
Combining the above two solutions, the incentive constraint in the steady-state can be written
as
Lh  min[LOh ; LTh ]; (2.38)
which indicates that if the incentive constraint is consistent with positive rents then agents must be
allowed to spend at minimum the fraction of time LTh on harvesting. But if the incentive constraint
is consistent with zero rents then agents must be allowed to spend at minimum the fraction of time
LOh on harvesting.
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2.3.3 Resource manager’s problem
The resource manager’s problem is to choose the optimal harvesting rule to maximize social
welfare21
SW = N
Z 1
0
U(R(t))e tdt: (2.39)
Notice that (2.39) differs from (2.24) in the following aspects. First, the probability of death 
does not enter into the former. The intuition behind this is that agents discount their lifetime utility
by the probability of death because they are mortal. However, the manager does not since, from
her perspective, society is infinitely lived. Second, the manager discounts the utility from time
zero—instead of the moment of birth as agents do—since what is matter from the manager’s point
of view is the present and thereafter.
The manager chooses the rules in a way that each agent will rationally find more profitable to
follow them. This implies that the rules must satisfy the incentive constraint in (2.38). There are
three possibilities. First, the incentive constraint is not binding. In this case, the optimal harvest
policy is a standard infinite horizon optimal control problem where the manager maximizes (2.39)
subject to the technologies in (2.17) and (2.18), the equilibrium wage rate in (2.19), the full
employment condition in (2.23), and the resource dynamics in (2.15) without taking into account
the incentive constraint. Second, the incentive constraint binds that is, (2.38) holds with equality
and LTh is the minimum. In this case, the constrained optimum level of labor Lh is set equal to
LTh and is associated with positive rents. Finally, it is possible that the incentive constraint binds
and LOh is the minimum in (2.38). Then, the constrained optimum level of labor Lh is set equal
to LOh and is associated with zero rents. This outcome, interestingly, indicates that the manager
21 It is assumed that the manager has the same pure time preference as the agents. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), who
originally developed the adopted utilitarian objective function, have shown that time-consistent optimal plans require
the government to have the same pure time preference as individuals.
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is not able to impose compliance without resource rent dissipation to take place and so de facto
open access results. In other words, the outcome of management does not differ from the long-run
outcome of open access described in Section 2.2 (we return to this shortly below).
If the incentive constraint does not bind the first-best allocation, eLh, and its associated
steady-state resource stock, eS, satisfy22
 = G0(eS)  wG(eS)bc
paeS   w; (2.40)
eS = K  1  aeLh
r
!
; (2.41)
where bc(< 0) represents the percentage change in the per cost of harvesting effort, w=aS, due to a
marginal increase in the stock S. The condition in (2.40) states that, at the margin, the resource
stock should be adjusted so that the returns to a unit of resource stock in situ (given by the rhs)
should equal the exogenous returns on investments elsewhere in the economy (given by the lhs).
The adjustment in the resource stock consists of two components: the effect of the change in stock
on the resource growth (given by term G0(eS)) and the effect of the change in the stock on the
harvesting costs (given by the term wG(eS)bc=(paeS   w)) (see Clark and Murno, 1975). Notice,
in particular, that the higher the resource rents the smaller the harvesting costs effect and, hence,
given , the smaller will be the marginal resource growth G0(eS) as well the optimal resource stock
(since G0(S) > 0). Then, following from (2.41), the optimal level of effort will be higher.
Interestingly, the comparative static analysis has shown that a rise in the resource price will
increase the optimal level of effort and decrease the optimal resource stock. By contrast, a rise in
the wage rate will decrease the optimal level of effort and increase the optimal resource stock.The
intuition goes as follows. If higher prices (wage rates) are expected, then the opportunity cost of
22 For a derivation of the first-best allocation and the related comparative static effects see Appendix D.
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leaving stock in situ rises (declines) relative to the benefits of the cost reduction a greater stock
provides. Therefore, a rise in the resource price leads to greater harvesting while a rise in the wage
rate works in the opposite direction.
The conclusion reached thus far is that by allowing the dynamic effects of trade liberalization in
the whole economy the effect of trade on the evolution of resource management regimes becomes
ambiguous. A trade-induced increase in the resource price might induce limiting harvesting (by
increasing LOh and eLh) causing some reallocation of labor to the manufacturing sector. This
would change the manufacturing productivity as well the equilibrium wage rate. The latter effect
however might work against limiting harvesting (by decreasing LOh and eLh) depending on the
available manufacturing technology. The implication of this is that the Copeland and Taylor’s
predictions might not apply in the present context, in the sense that if the wage rate increases after
trade liberalization, countries might exhibit open access even if the resource price is high. But if
the wage rate decreases countries might improve management even if the resource price is low.23
We now turn to a discussion of country characteristics and trade liberalization and to a search
of conditions under which the success or failure in the resource management emerges. To put
it formally, and in the way that it will be addressed, we are interested in whether Lh = LTh or
Lh = L
O
h .
2.3.4 Country characteristics, trade and management regimes
Country characteristics may facilitate, or not, transitions towards controlled harvesting
after trade-induced higher resource prices.24 Copeland and Taylor predict three categories of
economies:25 i) Ostrom economies: These are economies that might achieve some form of
23 Examples which are consistent with these scenaria are provided below.
24 The underlying presumption is that the resource-rich economy will be the exporter of the good. Hence, a move from
autarky to trade liberalization will induce an increase in the resource price.
25 To facilitate comparison we follow Copeland and Taylor’s definitions.
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regulation for high resource prices. ii) Clark economies: These are economies that might achieve
the first best for very high resource prices. iii) Hardin economies: These are economies that
cannot move from open access for all resource prices.
Recall that whenever LTh  LOh holds or, equivalently,
 + 
+  + 
N  r
a

1  w
paK

; (2.42)
the institutional equilibrium is always open access. Close inspection of (2.42) reveals that if
 + 
+  + 
N  r
a
or LTh 
r
a
; (2.43)
then LTh  LOh holds too. To put it differently, if the minimum level of labor required to satisfy the
incentive constraint with positive rents, LTh , is greater than the level of labor that leads the resource
to extinction, r=a, then open access equilibrium will result no matter the resource price p and
the wage rate w. Note, in particular, that countries with small probability of detection, low stock
replenishment, productive harvesting technology, and large number of impatient agents are more
likely to satisfy the inequality in (2.43) and so to exhibit de facto open access.26 The intuition is
that if harvesting technology is productive, then the current gains from working full-time in the
resource sector are expected to be high, especially when agents are impatient. Thus the incentive
to cheat can be removed only if the manager chooses a more generous harvesting rule. But when
this rule is applied to a large number of agents, given that the resource replenishes itself slowly,
it will result in reducing the resource stock causing the depletion of rents. Hence, we obtain a
Hardin economy just as in the Copeland-Taylor model. This in fact suggests that their prediction
of the Hardin economies’ failure to move beyond open access harvesting is not sensitive to the
technologies in the manufacturing sector.
26 To see this formally, normalize N to unity. Then, following from (2.36), LTh  1. Additionally, if r is small and a
large, as it is the case with the Hardin economies, then r=a < 1. Putting these results together gives, for very small ,
LTh  r=a as in (2.43).
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The Copeland-Taylor analysis predicts also that the Hardin economies will always experience
(in the steady-state) resource depletion and real income reduction while exporting the resource
good. On the contrary, as shown in Appendix E, if under autarky all labor force is allocated to
harvesting the resource while there are increasing returns in the manufacturing sector, then the
Hardin economies might gain from trade. To emphasize:
Proposition 5 If ( + )=( +  + )N  r=a and the small country exports the resource good,
then: (i) Free trade will not affect the incentive constraint. Resource rents remain zero in the
steady-state under all technologies in the manufacturing sector. (ii) Free trade under open access
conditions and higher resource good prices than autarky might lead to an increase in the steady-
state resource stock and welfare when the manufacturing sector operates under increasing returns.
There is some straightforward intuition behind the result of Proposition 5. Under autarky
the Hardin economies have the capability of destroying their renewable resource getting zero
output from both sectors. A move from autarky to free trade with a moderate increase in the
resource price shifts labor from the resource to the manufacturing sector. With increasing returns
to scale in the manufacturing sector, an increase in the amount of labor rises its average and
marginal productivity. As a result, the equilibrium wage rate is greater than that of the initial
autarky equilibrium. With higher wage rate labor is occupied in both sectors and the resource
stock starts to increase. Overall, opening up for trade can improve welfare even under open
access.27 Intuitively, it is just the higher wage rate that makes the resource sector—as well the
cheating—less attractive to the agents.28 An implication of this is that trade liberalization with
higher prices and increasing returns in the other sectors might be a precondition for the Hardin
27 The opposite result has been observed when other technologies are available. In particular, under decreasing and
constant returns higher resource prices induce a reallocation of labor in the resource sector intensifying the problem
of overexploitation. But with decreasing technologies, this reallocation process will increase the manufacturing
productivity providing a higher steady-state resource stock and total output relative to that of under constant returns.
Hence, as this reasoning suggests, under decreasing returns the welfare levels after trade can be higher than that under
constant returns (see also Hannesson, 2000).
28 Intuitively, a high wage rate can itself reduce the labor devoted to the resource sector making the manager’s work
easier. But since the minimum level of labor that deters cheating with positive rents is above the extinction level of
labor, open access (as discussed in this chapter) will always result for the Hardin economies.
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economies to avoid the resource extinction and the poor economic performance even under open
access resource conditions.29
The above results provide us with some information about the Hardin economies’ production
structure in the steady-state. In particular, under autarky there are two possible equilibria: in
one equilibrium the economy will specialize in the harvesting sector, whereas in the other it will
undertake diversified production. In the former case, since r < a, the resource is not allowed
to regenerate itself and, hence, it will be exhausted if Lh  ra : In this case the economy will
eventually completely specialize in the manufacturing sector. However, under trade with higher
resource prices the economy will undertake diversified production.
Matters are, however, different if ( + )=( +  + )N < r=a holds. It is obvious from
(2.42) that in this case LOh might be greater than LTh for higher resource prices and/or smaller
wage rates (recall that LOh is increasing in p and decreasing in w). But the opposite might be
true if both variables move to same direction. This, interestingly, implies that trade liberalization
can cause transitions to better/worse management regimes. Note, in particular, that countries
with fast-growing resource, small harvesting productivity, good detection capabilities, and small
number of patient agents are likely to satisfy this inequality. The intuition here is that if the
resource is fast-growing and harvesting productivity small, then the resource will be capable of
sustaining positive rents without it being extinguished. Therefore transitions from open access
to rent-generating management regimes are now feasible after changes in p and/or w, while a
small number of patient agents would make enforcement easier thereby sustaining a positive
replenishment rate. These are the Clark and Ostrom economies.
29 Béné (2003) provides an interesting discussion on the relation between fisheries and poverty in developing countries
emphasizing that property is related not only to the overexploitation of the common ownership (‘the endogenous
origin of poverty’) but also to the low alternative incomes (‘the exogenous origin of poverty’). In terms of our model,
the Hardin economies would experience low alternative incomes when their governments failed to simultaneously
stimulate the adoption of increasing returns technologies and open up trade.
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The Copeland-Taylor model predicts that Lh = LOh for low resource prices, and that Lh = LTh
for higher resource prices (or even Lh = eLh).30 These results are in contrast to the current
analysis. This has some straightforward intuition. In Copeland-Taylor model with constant wage
rate, rents rise linearly with the resource price. This implies that higher resource prices relax the
incentive constraint and, hence, the manager can credibly impose stricter rules. By allowing for
endogenous changes in the wage rate, we find a set of parameter values under which the incentive
constraint is satisfied with positive rents for low resource prices but for higher resource prices it is
satisfied with zero rents. As shown in Appendix E, this is possible when the manufacturing sector
operates under increasing returns. To emphasize:
Proposition 6 If (+)=(++)N < r=a, the manufacturing sector operates under increasing
returns, and the small country exports the resource good, then: (i) There exist parameter values
such that the country might satisfy the incentive constraint in the steady-state with positive resource
rents for low resource good prices. (ii) There exist parameter values such that the country might
satisfy the incentive constraint in the steady-state with zero resource rents for high resource good
prices.
Clearly, Proposition 6 is in contrast to the Copeland-Taylor predictions. There is some simple
intuition behind this proposition. The manufacturing employment share shrinks (expands) for
low (high) resource prices and, consequently, the equilibrium wage rate is small (large). This,
in turn, implies that for low (autarky) resource prices LOh might be greater than LTh and, hence,
Lh = L
T
h . And that for higher (international) resource prices LOh might be smaller than LTh and,
hence, Lh = LOh .31 The implication of these results is, interestingly, that successful management
30 The ‘transition’ higher prices and the possibility to achieve the fist best level eLh depend on parameters values. In
fact, higher resource prices lead optimally to greater harvesting but the extend to which the manager responds to
that depends on what Copeland and Taylor call the ‘incentive to extinguish the resource’ which is defined by the
parameters r and : Clark economies have strong incentive to extinguish themselves (i.e. r < ) in comparison with
the Ostrom ones. Hence, at very high prices, the former countries can achieve the first best level eLh. In our model,
since prices and wage rates can move in the opposite direction this result is ambiguous. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we shall not distinguish these economies (i.e. management regimes) from each other.
31 It has been observed that under constant and decreasing returns in the manufacturing sector, the incentive constraint
is met with positive rents for higher resource prices. Indeed, there is a variation in the ‘transition’ high price between
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can be achieved only prior trade liberalization.
Although trade liberalization can destabilize the management systems in the Clark and Ostrom
economies, it is possible to increase their welfare levels if the manufacturing sector operates
under increasing returns. This is therefore another example where increasing returns can moderate
the welfare losses from trade under open access resource conditions. The intuition is that the
increased manufacturing productivity reduces the attractiveness of the resource resulting in higher
total output. In particular, while under autarky the Clark and Ostrom economies will either
specialize in the harvesting sector or undertake diversified production (in the steady-state), they
will completely specialize in the manufacturing sector under trade with higher resource prices.
Nevertheless, since trade liberalization may bring new shocks (through, for example, changes in
demand and technologies) the concern of a possible overexploitation under open access remains,
in particular so when economies are not able to take the terms of trade effects into account.
2.4 Extensions
In this section we extend the model by allowing individuals’ characteristics or stricter
punishment.
2.4.1 Individuals characteristics
Ostrom (1990) has argued that an individual’s decision to support (or not) a change in a given
harvesting rule is affected by the following variables: benefits, costs, opportunities, and shared
norms. We have already discussed the importance of the first three variables. Now, we introduce
the possibility where shared norms envolve in the individual’s decision.32 (This possibility has
been analyzed in more details in Chapter 1.)
the two technologies. For moderate rises in the resource price after opening up for trade, the ‘transition’ price is
higher if the manufacturing sector operates under constant returns than under decreasing returns. The reason is that
under decreasing returns the wage rate after trade is smaller than unity (since the manufacturing employment share is
higher) and so, following from (2.37), LOT is larger than that under constant returns.
32 On the role of social norms in common-pool resource problems, see also Sethi and Somanathan (1996) who consider
a decentralized management.
65
One interesting possibility where norms can evolve is when agents comply with the announced
rule and voluntarily contribute in the monitoring and sanctioning process.33 In this case, the
agents have the following choices: comply with the harvesting rule l and punish agents who are
seen to cheat providing evidence against them to the manager and their peers34 or, alternatively, do
not comply with the rule thereby running the risk to be caught and punished at the rate dt. For
convenience, we will call the former agents ‘non-cheaters’ and the latter ‘cheaters’ and denote
their proportion in the population as nnc and nc, respectively.35
Suppose that the date at which the regulation is to be decided for both types of agents exist.
While the manager does not know which named agent cheats, she does know the proportion of
each group of population. In this case the manager still chooses a common harvesting rule. But
now she has an additional concern which is to keep the proportion of non-cheaters high as a way
to improve enforcement capabilities and, hence, increase the rate of compliance.36
In this context, the fine for a detected agent is a mixed of informal and formal punishments.
The formal fine, F , is again to lose access to the resource and work in the manufacturing sector
henceforth. The informal fine, , can be of any form as social disapproval, ostracism or physical
damage.
When one agent punishes another, the former incurs a cost  (enforcement cost) and inflicts a
loss  on the latter. The maximum over the agents’ options V R(t) is given by (see Appendix F)
33 This assumption strikes us as reasonable, especially for low density type of resources, small number of agents and/or
many-sided relations among agents. Therefore, if at least one of the above conditions holds in our economies (without
violating their above mentioned characteristics), then the type of management investigated here might be feasible.
34 As Ostrom (1990, p.17) notes ‘[Herders] obverse the behavior of the other herders and have an incentive to report
contractual infractions.’
35 One could also allow the probability of being caught  to vary with the proportion of non-cheating nnc: In this case,
we can write (nnc) with (0) = 0 and 0(nnc) > 0 (which is implicitly assumed here).
36 It is should be noted that the structure of the manager’s optimization problem remains the same. Another possibility
would be the maximization to take account the population dynamics which is the focus of Chapter 1.
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V R(t) = max
"
paSl + (1  l)w   Nn(t)c + _V R
 + 
;
paS   (F (t) +Nn(t)nc) + _V R
 + 
#
:
(2.44)
Two points need emphasis. First, notice that when the proportion of non-cheaters is sufficiently
high, then the cheaters may perform worse than the non-cheaters, even if paS > w (providing that
 > 0). The reason for this is intuitive. When the proportion of non-cheaters is sufficiently high,
on the one hand, the damages from sanctions are large (in particular, larger than that of the case
of single sanctioning) and, on the other, the enforcement costs for the non-cheaters are small. The
second point is that for any given intensity of sanctions the greater the resource price, the larger is
the cheaters’ expected income relative to the non-cheaters’. But notice also that this effect can be
moderated by a rise in the wage rate.
Then the incentive constraint, in the steady-state, is given by
l(paS   w) 

 + 
+  + 

[(paS   w) + N(n(t)c   n(t)nc)] : (2.45)
Condition (2.45)—together with (2.33)—shows that population characteristics do matter when
setting the harvesting rule l: In particular, l is smaller if the proportion of non-cheaters n(t)nc
or the damages of informal sanctions  are sufficiently large. In contrast, if the proportion of
cheaters n(t)c or the enforcement costs  are sufficiently high the manager must choose a more
generous rule l. An intuitive explanation for this is that anticipating higher benefits from cheating
(the damages faced by the cheaters are small with few non-cheaters), the manager will increase
the access to offset somehow the cheaters’ economic advantage and, therefore, conserve the
non-cheating behaviour in the population.37
Extending the model to allow for heterogenous behaviour among agents brings therefore some
37 Of course, there might be the case where the manager cannot increase the level of effort (see Section 1.4.2).
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changes to our previous analysis. The Hardin economies might again exist if the large size of
their population brings anonymity among agents. In this case, informal sanctioning devices that
could reduce the gains from cheating and relax the incentive constraint will be less effective.
However, if the population of non-cheaters is sufficiently large and/or the detection is high, then
the level of effort that needs to be excluded is smaller allowing for a larger resource stock.38 In
this case, the open access result would be replaced by positive low rent equilibria (see Section
1.4.2). On the other hand, the small population size of the Clark and Ostrom economies makes the
self-monitoring process more effective and so the manager’s work easier. But the fact that their
resource is capable of regenerating positive rents implies that the attractiveness of the resource
sector is constantly high. It is therefore more likely that the individuals will want to cheat and
work full-time in this sector (see Section 1.4.1).
In this context, trade liberalization is therefore rather desirable.39 The significance of this is
twofold. First, trade can induce changes in prices and in harvesting technologies. The second
aspect is that trade can decrease the impact of informal sanctions as a consequence of higher
economic integration. All these effects will tend to increase the gains from cheating behaviour.
Therefore, our initial prediction about the negative impact of higher resource prices (Proposition
6) can now arise from an increase in misbehaviour. This effect, as noted earlier, can however be
moderated if the wage rate rises, too.40
38 Note that the evolution of the resource stock is now given by
_S = G(S) H(S;Lh) = G(S)  aN(lnnc + nc)S;
and so, if the proportion of the non-cheaters nnc is sufficiently large (or the proportion of cheaters nc small), then the
aggregate harvest rate H(S;Lh) will be smaller and so the available resource stock S larger. This suggests that an
increase in the proportion of non-cheaters can undo the negative impacts of other unfavorable country characteristics
such as a large number of agents, productive harvesting technology, unproductive and costly centralized monitoring,
and low stock replenishment.
39 On this issue see also Section 1.4 and Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
40 More specifically, all economies may experience an increase in the wage rate after trade when there are increasing
returns in manufacturing. Yet, for the Hardin economies, this may also happen when there are decreasing returns.
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Overall, the above results emphasize that individuals’ characteristics matter in the transition
to enforced property rights. Indeed, enforced property rights regimes might be obtained (or be
obtained easier) if social behaviour is not a factor. Trade liberalization could however disrupt
social behaviour and so the manager should ensure its continuation by modifying the rules in
accordance with the manufacturing technologies.
2.4.2 Fines
In the main analysis it has been assumed that the maximum fine that the manager can impose
to the detected agents is their loss of access to the resource sector. The concern with this is that
if agents have always the opportunity to work in manufacturing sector, then this fine may not
work as a real threat (especially in the case of a constant wage). Actually, if the wage rate is
endogenously determined there is a serious risk of losing high future manufacturing returns. This
effect could trigger a higher rate of compliance with harvesting rules.41 To capture this idea,
suppose that the manager imposes a more severe fine to the detected agents that is, they lose
access to both sectors.42 In this case, we can write V R(t)  F (t) = 0:
The incentive constraint, in the steady state, is given by
l(paS   w) 

 + 
+  + 

(paS   w) 


+  + 

w: (2.46)
The additional component of the incentive constraint, given by the term w=(+ + ), adds new
interesting features of the critical level of labor l. Note, in particular, that a relatively large wage
rate relaxes the incentive constraint and so the manager is capable of reducing the harvesting rule l
without encouraging cheating. The intuition behind this goes as follows. A high wage rate makes
the resource sector less attractive. This, however, indicates high expected benefits of the resource
41 Copeland and Taylor (2009) have also extended their model to consider this case. However, their model with constant
wage rate does not address the possibility of the threat with the way it is approached here.
42 This structure of fine is, arguably, very strict in the sense that a detected agent cannot remain unemployed forever. A
more realistic scenario would be for them to lose a fraction of their manufacturing rents, as in Copeland and Taylor
(2009). This will not change our results qualitatively and, thus, without lose generality, it is not considered here.
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sector (through higher expected resource stock). Then, the threat of losing future resource rents
is significant relative to the current benefits of cheating. Furthermore, limiting harvesting will
expand the labor in the manufacturing sector. If the latter happens to operate under increasing
returns, this expansion will increase the expected manufacturing returns making cheating even
less attractive.
Conversely, if the wage rate is quite small the manager have to increase the harvesting rule
l to discourage the agents’ incentive to cheat. The intuition here goes as follows. A low wage
rate increases the attractiveness of the resource sector and, as a consequence, expected harvesting
returns will be small (through smaller expected resource stock). Then, the threat of losing future
resource rents is insignificant relative to the current benefits from cheating, especially if the
manufacturing sector operates under increasing returns (through lower expected returns from a
shrinking manufacturing sector).
Overall, the stricter fine works more effective when the wage rate is high. It also works better
if the agents are patient and the probability of detection is high (given by the term =(+  + )).
In this situation, the incentive to cheat becomes vanish small. The implication of this is that
all economies could credibly reduce the harvesting rule l. But again the type of technology in
the manufacturing sector remains crucial on how and whether the regulatory stringency would
increase compliance.
2.5 Concluding remarks
Trade liberalization alters the dynamics of an economy and so it is difficult to a priori predict
whether these dynamics will involve in enforcing new management regimes on common property
resources. Though, arguably, changes in relative prices is an important source of institutional
change, internal characteristics are important too.
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This chapter has extended Copeland and Taylor (2009) to show that technologies in the
alternative industries do matter in explaining the success or failure in resource management,
and that population characteristics do matter too. It has also shown that increasing returns
in alternative industries can moderate the negative welfare effects of trade under open access
resource use and, under certain conditions, they can promote management reforms.
The limitations of the present analysis shed lights for future research. It will be interesting (and
challenging) to modify the model to endogenize the adoption of increasing returns technologies
in alternative industries (in the lines of Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (1992)). This
extension would contribute to the discussion on how the evolution of institutional context affects
the long-run economic structure of resource-rich countries.
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Appendix D
Derivation of (2.40)
The manager’s problem can be expressed as
max
Lh
SW (t) = N
Z 1
t
U(R())e ( t)d ; (D.1)
subject to
H = aLhS; (D.2)
M = F (Lm) ; (D.3)
F 0 (Lm) = w; (D.4)
Lm + Lh = N; (D.5)
dS
dt
= aS(1  S=K) H; (D.6)
R =
paLhS + F (N   Lh)
N(p)
; where (p) is a price index. (D.7)
The Hamiltonian of this problem is given by
H = U

paLhS + F (N   Lh)
(p)

e t +  [G(S)  aLhS] ; (D.8)
where Lh is the control variable, and S is the state variable. Since U() in (D.8) is concave and the
constraint is linear in Lh, the Hamiltonian is concave and the maximization of H can be achieved
by setting @H=@Lh = 0. Thus, we have the following conditions
@H
@Lh
= U 0() [paS   w]e
 t
(p)
  aS = 0; (D.9)
@H
@
= rS(1  S=K)  aLhS; (D.10)
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@H
@S
= U 0()paLhe
 t
(p)
+  [G0(S)  aLh] =   _: (D.11)
Solving (D.9) for  one obtains
 =
U 0()
aS
[paS   w]
(p)
e t: (D.12)
Differentiating (D.12) with respect to t gives
_ =  e tU
0()
aS
[paS   w]
(p)
: (D.13)
Substituting (D.12) and (D.13) into (D.11) gives
U 0()paLhe
 t
(p)
+
U 0()
aS
[paS   w]
(p)
e t [G0(S)  aLh] = e tU
0()
aS
[paS   w]
(p)
: (D.14)
Perturbing (D.14) ones arrives at
 = G0(S) +
waLh
paS   w: (D.15)
Setting @H
@
= 0—after making use of G(S) = rS(1  S=K)—yields
Lh =
r
a

1  S
K

: (D.16)
Finally, substituting aLh = G(S)S and bc = d(w=aS)w=aS =   1S into (D.15) one obtains the optimal
first-best allocation of labor as given in (2.40).
Comparative static analysis
Differentiating (D.15) with respect to p yields
0 = G00(S)
@S
@p
+
wa@Lh
@p
(paS   w)  (waLh)
h
aS + pa@S
@p
i
(paS   w)2 ;
and manipulating gives
a2LhS
(+)
=
@S
@p
24G00(S)(paS   w)2
w
  r
K
(paS   w)  a2Lhp
( )
35 :
Differentiating (D.16) with respect to p yields
a
@Lh
@p
=   r
K
@S
@p
: (D.17)
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Therefore, one obtains
@S
@p
< 0 and, following from (D.17), @Lh
@p
> 0. (D.18)
Differentiating (D.15) with respect to w yields
0 = G00(S)
@S
@w
+
( w r
K
@S
@w
+ aLh)(paS   w)  waLh(pa @S@w   1)
(paS   w)2 ;
and manipulating gives
 a2LhSp
( )
=
@S
@w
24G00(S)(paS   w)2   wr
K
(paS   w)  wa2Lhp
( )
35 :
Differentiating (D.16) with respect to w yields
a
@Lh
@w
=   r
K
@S
@w
: (D.19)
Therefore, one obtains
@S
@w
> 0 and, following from (D.19), @Lh
@w
< 0. (D.20)
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Appendix E
A numerical example of Proposition 543
The example here replicates the Hardin economies’ characteristics to show that opening up for
trade with a higher resource price than under autarky might lead to an increase in welfare, despite
the fact that the resource remains under open access conditions.
Consider a small economy that cannot influence the world price of the resource good. To
illustrate, assume that the production function in the manufacturing sector is given by
M(Lm) = L

m, (E.1)
with the marginal product of labor being given by
M 0(Lm) = L 1m : (E.2)
Let  = 1,  = 1=2, and  = 2 in case of constant, decreasing and increasing returns to scale,
respectively. Assuming efficiency we obtain
L 1m = w: (E.3)
Under open access, the value of the average product of labor when applied to the extraction of the
renewable resource will be equal to the wage rate, w, in equilibrium. Using (E.3) and (2.22) we
get
pa

K(1  aLh
r
)

= L 1m : (E.4)
For a given p, equations (E.3), (E.4) and (2.23) determine the allocations of labor, Lh and Lm
and, hence, the wage rate w, in an open access equilibrium. The values of S, H and M can then
be found from (2.21), (2.22) and (E.1), respectively. Finally, consider that all agents have the
43 Computations, available upon request, have been performed in Maple.
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following CES utility function
u(H;M) = [(a1H)
 + (a2M)
]
1
 ; with  1    1;  6= 0; (E.5)
where a1 and a2 are positive constants. The indirect utility function of the utility in (E.5) is (see
Varian 1992, p. 56, 112)
V (p; 1; R) =
Rh
( p
a1
)s + ( 1
a2
)s
i 1
s
; (E.6)
where s = 
 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and R is the national income given by the sum
pH +M: Let, without loss of generality, a1 = 2, a2 = 1,  = 0:5, N = Lh +Lm = 1, and K = 1.
Assume that the intrinsic rate r is equal to 0:5, and that the productivity parameter a is equal
to 0:7. To help build intuition, assume that the probability of detection is  = 0. Then, following
from (2.36), LTh = 1. Assume also that  = 2. Under autarky, there is an equilibrium in which all
labor force is employed in the resource sector. (The other equilibrium is one where the labor force
is employed in both sectors and after opening up for trade with higher prices (p > 4:76) labor
moves in the manufacturing sector, as discussed below.) In this equilibrium, the economy can
destroy its renewable resource getting zero output from both sectors with its transformation curve
to approach the origin. To see this, substitute (1   Lh)2 into (2.22) to obtain the transformation
function as
H = a

1 
p
M
 
1  a(1 
p
M)
r
!
; (E.7)
which after substituting the assigned values of a and r becomes
H =  0:28 + 1:26
p
M   0:98M: (E.8)
One can verify that if the economy devotes all labor force to the resource sector (or if M is too
small), then it will derive zero total output.
Let now the economy open to trade. Assume that the international price of the resource good is
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p = 3. At this price level, labor will shift to the manufacturing sector. Intuitively, after opening
up for trade with higher resource prices, the lhs of equilibrium condition in (E.4) becomes greater
than the rhs. The condition will hold only if labor moves into the manufacturing sector. At the
new equilibrium, the labor force in the resource sector is LOh = 0:11 and the resource output is
H = 0:06. In this case, the resource stock recovers, S = 0:85. The labor force in manufacturing
sector is Lm = 0:89, the manufacturing output is M = 0:89, and the equilibrium wage rate is
w = 1:79. The national income is R = 0:98 and the utility level is V = 1:65. Finally, since
LTh > L
O
h the economy still exhibits open access that is, Lh = LOh .
A numerical example of Proposition 6
This example replicates the Clark and Ostrom economies’ characteristics to show that these
economies might enforce property rights under autarky but exhibit open access after opening up
for trade with higher resource prices.
Assume that the intrinsic rate r is equal to 0:7, and that the productivity parameter a is equal
to 0:5. The value of the probability of detection , death rate , and time preference  can be any
such that LTh < 0:9. (The other parameter values are as in the above example.) Under autarky,
there is an equilibrium outcome in which almost all labor force is employed in the resource sector,
LOh = 0:91. Its output is H = 0:16 and that of the manufacturing sector is M = 0:01. The
steady-state resource stock is S = 0:35, and the equilibrium wage rate is w = 0:17. National
income is R = 0:17 and the utility level is V = 0:5. Observe that the incentive constraint is
met with positive rents that is, Lh = LTh even if the resource price is low, pA = 1. (The other
equilibrium is one where labor force is employed in both sectors LOh = 0:5 and after trade
with higher prices (p > 3:1) labor will move in the manufacturing sector. This suggests that if
LTh > 0:5, which is satisfied for % <  + ; then the economy will always exhibit de facto open
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access.)
Let now the economy open to trade. Assume that the international price is p = 2:5. At the
new equilibrium, the labor force in the resource sector is LOh = 0:68, the output of the resource
sector is H = 0:17 and the resource stock is S = 0:52. The labor force in the manufacturing
sector is Lm = 0:32, the manufacturing output is M = 0:10, and the equilibrium wage rate is
w = 0:64. The national income is R = 0:53 and the utility level is V = 0:97. Assume now
that the international price rises further at level p = 4: Then, all the labor force moves to the
manufacturing sector and so Lm = 1. The equilibrium wage is w = 2 and the resource stock is
S = 1. The national income is R = 1 and the utility level is V = 1:5. Observe that now the
incentive constraint is met with zero rents that is, Lh = LOh .
Overall, the economy shifts to a transition from a rent-generating management regime under
autarky to open access after trade liberalization. Notice, however, that there are gains from trade
even if the resource is under open access.
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Appendix F
Derivation of (2.44)
The discounted benefits of the cheating behaviour in the current period are defined as
V c(t) = paSdt+[1 dt][1 dt][dt[V R(t+dt) F (t+dt) nnc(t+dt)N ]+[1 dt]V R(t+dt)];
(F.1)
and the corresponding of the non-cheating behaviour as
V nc(t) = [paSl+(1 l)w]dt+[1 dt][1 dt][dt[V R(t+dt) nn(t+dt)N ]+[1 dt]V R(t+dt)];
(F.2)
where V R(t) = max[V c(t); V nc(t)].
Using the first order Taylor approximation we obtain
V R(t+ dt) t V R(t) + _V R(t)dt; (F.3)
F (t+ dt) t F (t) + _F (t)dt;
nn(t+ dt) t nn(t) + _nn(t)dt;
nnc(t+ dt) t nnc(t) + _nnc(t)dt:
If V c(t) is the maximum, using (F.1) and applying the appropriate substitutions (from (F.3)), we
have
V R(t) t paSdt+[1 (+)dt+dt2]
24 dt  V R(t) + _V R(t)dt  F (t)  _F (t)dt  (nnc(t) + _nnc(t)dt)N

+[1  dt][V R(t) + _V R(t)dt]
35 ; (F.4)
which—after decomposing the rhs—becomes
V R(t) t
1
( + )dt
2666664
paSdt+ _V R(t)dt
 dt
h
F (t) + _F (t)dt+ nnc(t)N +  _nnc(t)Ndt
i
+dt3 [   ( + )]

V R(t) + _V R(t)dt  F (t)
  _F (t)dt  (nnc(t) + _nnc(t)dt)N

+dt [dt  ( + )] [1  dt][V R(t) + _V R(t)dt]
3777775 : (F.5)
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Canceling dt terms and letting dt go to zero, one arrives at
V R(t) t
1
( + )
h
paS    [F (t) + nnc(t)N ] + _V R(t)
i
: (F.6)
Similarly, if V nc(t) is the maximum, using (F.2) and (F.3), we have
V nc(t) t [paSl+(1  l)w]dt+[1 (+)dt+dt2]
24 dt[V R(t) + _V R(t)dt (nc(t) + _nc(t)dt)N ]
+[1  dt][V R(t) + _V R(t)dt];
35 ; (F.7)
which implies
V R(t) t
1
( + )
[paSl + (1  l)w   nc(t)N + _V R(t)]: (F.8)
Finally, (F.6) and (F.8) give the elements of (2.44).
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Chapter 3 Commodity taxation in the presence of imperfect competition and a global
public bad
3.1 Introduction
It is well know that, in the presence of negative externalities, Pareto optimality requires a
corrective tax (equal to the externalities) that internalizes the social cost. Though, arguably, a
corrective tax per unit of pollution is the most efficient policy measure under perfectly competitive
markets, it may be inappropriate under imperfectly competitive markets if it increases the cost of
production and restricts further the (suboptimal) level of production.1
While the distortion imposed by imperfect competition might be responsible for some of the
downward pressure on environmental standards, particular emphasis is often placed on the role of
international trade. The argument is that without a complete set of instruments due to increasing
economic integration, and the failure to achieve a global environmental agreement, countries will
seek to implement environmental policy in a way that does not distort domestic competitiveness
and simultaneously gives them the ability to distribute rents. Recognizing this possibility the
literature has paid predominately attention to the strategic use of Pigouvian taxation. In reality,
however, few taxes are targeted directly on the externality associated with pollution, and any
correction for environmental damages is left to commodity taxes imposed either at the source
of production (‘origin’ principle) or where consumption takes place (‘destination’ principle). In
OECD countries, for example, about 90% of environmental tax revenues stem from indirect taxes
on motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels.2
1 Early contributions on this include, among others, Buchanan (1969) and Baumol and Oates (1988).
2 Though it is not of course the efficient tax to use. Fullerton et al. (2001) find that the introduction of an emission tax
could raise welfare by more than twice as much as an output tax. They argue however that a direct tax on the quantity
of emissions generated is associated with high costs of measurement, monitoring, and enforcement.
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The objective of this chapter is to investigate which tax principle welfare dominates when
production takes place within an imperfectly competitive environment and it causes environmental
pollution (a global public bad). It identifies conditions under which the presence of global public
bad tilts the welfare comparison towards, interestingly, either tax principle.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews—albeit briefly—the existing literature
on commodity taxation and strategic environmental policy. Section 3.3 describes the basic model.
Section 3.4 characterizes the noncooperative environmental taxes under the destination and origin
regime, while Section 3.5 characterizes the corresponding environmental taxes in cooperative
tax-setting. Section 3.6 further clarifies the analysis through numerical examples. Finally, Section
3.7 briefly concludes.
3.2 Related literature
Increasing awareness of climate change has led policymakers and the academic community
to look for the best way to limit its consequences. Environmental taxes have been extensively
examined as an economic solution to control this global problem. An important issue in designing
environmental taxes in open economies is however the choice between ‘origin’ and ‘destination’
principles of taxation since, given the transboundary nature of externality and the fact that
economies trade goods, both principles may be subject to environmental standard competition.
The result of such competition may well be so a tendency toward inefficient (from global
perspective) environmental tax levels.
The public finance literature has extensively examined the welfare implications of commodity
taxation.3 Recall, that under the destination principle the tax is paid in the country where the
goods are consumed, whereas under the origin principle the tax is paid in the country where goods
3 See, among others, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Lockwood (1993), Keen and Lahiri (1998), Hashimzade et al. (2005)
and Haufler et al. (2005).
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are produced. Therefore, everything that is, domestically consumed—including imports—is
taxed under the destination principle while everything that is, domestically produced—including
exports—is taxed under the origin principle. The main result of this literature is that if markets
are imperfectly competitive and taxes are set noncooperatively, the origin principle Pareto
dominates the destination principle. The explanation is that under the origin principle exchange
efficiency is assured by consumer arbitrage leaving the output taxes free to deal directly with the
output distortions. Under the destination principle, on the contrary, exchange efficiency requires
countries to set the same tax rate leaving them with insufficient instruments to deal with the
output distortions. More recently, Cremer and Gahvari (2006) revisit this issue but they do so in
a model where there exist transboundary production externalities. They argue that either regime
may Pareto dominate as both can entail pollution level above the first-best. This paper is closely
related to this chapter, but there are also distinct differences between them. Cremer and Cahvari
assume perfectly competitive markets and two tax instruments, one output tax—either destination-
or origin-based—and one emission tax. In this setting, they show that one instrument is used
for fiscal competition and the other for combating pollution depending on the principle in place.
Unlikely Cremer and Cahvari, this chapter is concerned with the case where only one policy
instrument is available to deal with several distortions simultaneously.
Other papers in the literature with transboundary pollution emphasize strategic trade
considerations. A key issue in this literature is that in the absence of appropriate instruments
(trade taxes), ‘large open economies’ acting strategically will set environmental standards at an
inefficient—from a global perspective—level. 4;5 Lobbying activity (see, for instance, Helm,
4 For an early discussion on this issue see Whalley (1991). See also Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Chen and
Woodland (2013).
5 In light of this fear, a small but growing literature (see, among others, McCorriston and Sheldon (2005) and Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2014)) explores the possibility that the resolution of the ecological dumping problem may lie
in existing GATT/WTO rules on Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs). The concept of climate change BTAs is that
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2010) and the absence of international cooperative environmental policies6 will, arguably,
intensify this tendency. The underlying idea is that optimal policy requires two instruments that
target directly the inefficiencies (the pollution externality and the trade flows).
Markusen (1975), employing a two-country trade model with two goods, focuses on the case
where only one instrument (production, consumption or trade taxes) is available to deal with
several distortions. He argues that the second-best tax structures depend on whether the good
is imported or exported.7 Kruttila (1991) considers the second best nature of environmental
taxation imposed either on production or consumption and under perfectly competitive markets.
He finds that in the production tax case, the exporting (importing) country tends to set a higher
(lower) tax than the Pigouvian tax, and that the tariff revenue effect (if it is available) tends to
reduce (increase) the environmental tax. In the case of a consumption tax, the incentive works in
opposite direction.8 Strand (2010) argues that an exporting country has an incentive to implement
environmental policy even though it does not really care about the environmental quality (see also
Ludema and Wooton (1994) and Copeland (1996)). Raucher (1994) examines whether ecological
dumping is optimal for an exporting country. He shows that ecological dumping depends on the
relative size of terms of trade effect and parameter values related to demand and supply.
Many studies have focused on imperfectly competitive markets. Barrett (1994) and Neary
(2006) argue that governments have a strategic incentive to set weak emission standards only
carbon-taxing countries would levy import fees on goods from non-carbon-taxing countries. There are however
issues that are still unclear regarding the implementation of BTAs such as whether or not such adjustment is
WTO-consistent, the appropriateness or not of such adjustment in reducing carbon leakage and the possibility of
assessing or calculating BTAs. Therefore, in terms of our model, a comparison between BTAs and commodity
taxation policy implementation would be a valuable contribution to this literature.
6 Finus et al. (2013) provide an overview of key issues in global environmental agreements. See also Vlassis (2013)
who analyzes the welfare effects of pollution-tax harmonization.
7 This result is in similar spirit with that obtained here. However, Markusen’s (1975) analysis assumes that the
domestic country has monopoly power in setting prices, and that the foreign country does not set environmental taxes.
As such, his analysis differs from the one presented in this chapter.
8 That is, the importer (exporter) tends to set higher (lower) tax than the Pigouvian tax and the tariff revenue effect
tends to reduce (increase) the environmental tax. In our model, the terms of trade effects work in same direction but
the intuition may be slightly different due to the nature of considered form of taxation.
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if firms compete in a Cournot fashion. On the contrary, if firms play a la Bertrand, then the
governments’ incentive works in the direction to set stricter emission standards. Ulph and Ulph
(1993) and Conrad (2001) consider a two-stage game where both government and firms behave
strategically (firms move first by choosing cleaner technologies). Under this game structure, Ulph
and Ulph identify conditions where the government’s incentive to relax environmental policy is
lessen, and Conrad shows that the tax is set to the Pigouvian level. Duval and Hamilton (2002)
and Withagen et al. (2007) show that an exporting country may have an incentive to impose a high
emission tax. Kurtyka and Mahenc (2011), within a model of differentiated varieties (polluting
and green variety), argue that stricter environmental policy on the polluting varieties is optimal.
Against this background, this chapter considers commodity taxation as an indirect
environmental tax on an imperfectly competitive good the production of which causes
transboundary pollution. This approach allows us to explore the interactions among tax
competition, imperfect competition and transboundary pollution as well as their welfare
consequences.
3.3 The basic model
Consider a world consisting of two countries: a ‘domestic’ and a ‘foreign’ one (the latter’s
variables are denoted by an asterisk) with a single representative consumer residing in each. Each
country produces two tradeable goods: one produced under conditions of perfect competition and
one under conditions of imperfect competition. The competitive good is produced by a single
factor of production which is subject to constant returns to scale and is fixed in supply.9 This good
is taken as the numeraire good and is nonpolluting, with production level denoted by m (m). The
imperfectly competitive good is homogenous and is produced by a single firm in each country.
9 Consumer’s endownment of factor is fixed and so is suppressed from the analysis.
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Production cost functions of that good are nonlinear and given by
c(x) (c(x)) with c0(x) > 0 (c0(x) > 0) and c00(x) > 0 (c00(x) > 0): (3.1)
The production of the imperfectly competitive good is associated with a pollutant which confers
disutility to consumers. Pollution is therefore modeled as a by-product of domestic production
level, denoted by x, and the foreign production level, denoted by x. Pollution in the domestic
(foreign) country is given by10
k = k(x+ x) ; k = k(x+ x); (3.2)
with k(0) = 0 and k(0) = 0. The function k(k) is differentiable, increasing and convex and so
k0() > 0 (k0() > 0) and k00() (k00() > 0).
The demand of the imperfectly competitive good in domestic (foreign) country is given by
z(q) (z(q)) with z0(q) < 0 (z0(q) < 0); (3.3)
where q (q) denotes the consumer price. Each country supplies its own consumer as well as
exporting any surplus to the other country without any transportation cost. Market clearing for the
world thus requires
z(q) + z(q) = x+ x: (3.4)
Countries (‘governments’) maximize welfare by choosing the commodity tax rate either following
the destination or the origin principle of taxation. Firms’ behaviour is modelled as Cournot
competitors. The sequential structure of the model consists of two stages. In stage 1, countries
simultaneously choose a tax rate t, under the destination principle, or  under the origin principle
of taxation. In stage 2, firms simultaneously choose output, given prices and taxes. We solve the
10 Notice that the pollution function can capture the possibility that pollution is a local public bad too. This will
require to set the derivatives kx and kx equal to zero. Though the distinction between global and local public bad
is interesting from a theoretical point, it will not be considered here. For contributions on this see, among others,
Raucher (1997), Duval and Hamilton (2002), Hatzipanayotou et al. (2008) and Anouliès (2010).
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game using backward inductions.11
3.4 Noncooperative equilibrium
In the noncooperative equilibrium each country chooses tax rates to maximize its own welfare
ignoring any impact of its decision on the other country’s welfare. We begin the analysis with the
destination principle of taxation.
3.4.1 Destination principle of taxation
If both countries follow the destination principle of taxation consumers pay the tax to the
country in which they consume the good. Arbitrage requires that the producers prices will be
equalized. Denoting this price by p, consumer price in the domestic (foreign) country is given by
q = p+ t ; q = p+ t: (3.5)
The domestic (foreign) firm’s profits are given by
 = xp(x+ x)  c(x) ;  = xp(x+ x)  c(x); (3.6)
where p(x+ x) denotes the inverse demand for the good, with in particular12
p0 = 1=(z0 + z0) < 0: (3.7)
The first- and second-order conditions for profit maximization for the domestic and foreign firm
are, respectively, given by
x = xp
0 + p  c0 = 0 ; x = xp0 + p  c0 = 0; (3.8)
xx = 2p
0 + xp00   c00 < 0 ; xx = 2p0 + xp00   c00 < 0: (3.9)
Following from (3.8), the equilibrium level of outputs for the domestic and foreign firm are given
11 The basic setup of the model is explained from the viewpoint of the domestic country only; the foreign’s country
variables and expressions are derived analogously.
12 This follows by substituting (3.5) into (3.3) and that into (3.4).
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by
x =
c0   p
p0
; x =
c0   p
p0
; (3.10)
and imply that x > x if and only if c0 < c0. Hence, in equilibrium, the lower unit cost firm (that
is, the more efficient) has the larger market share.
It is assumed that13
xx  p0 + xp00 < 0 ; xx  p0 + xp00 < 0; (3.11)
xx < xx ; 

xx < 

xx; (3.12)
d  xxxx   xxxx > 0: (3.13)
Finally, it is the case that
t(d
dt
) = xxt + xx

t +
@
@t
; (3.14)
which upon substituting x = 0, @@t = 0 and x = xp
0
, becomes
t = xp
0xt : (3.15)
Similarly,
t (
d
dt
) = xp0xt: (3.16)
Following from (3.15), if xt is positive, then t is negative (since p0 < 0). The domestic firm
can therefore realize higher profits with a lower tax rate. But if xt is negative, then profit shifting
requires an increase in the tax rate.
It is straightforward to show (the details of this are relegated in Appendix G) that
pt =  p
0z0
d
[d   p0 [(xx + xx)  (xx + xx)] ; (3.17)
13 These assumptions insure that the reaction functions are downward sloping so that a Cournot equilibrium exists.
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xt =
p0z0
d
(xx   xx); (3.18)
xt =
p0z0
d
(xx   xx): (3.19)
It then follows that
xt + x

t =
(p0z0)
d
[(xx   xx) + (xx   xx)] < 0. (3.20)
Close observation of (3.17)-(3.19) reveals that they cannot be readily signed. We so have: An
increase in the destination-based tax will
 reduce both firms’ output level when the inverse demand is linear or firms have the same
marginal cost;
 reduce the inefficient firm’s output level and increase or reduce the efficient firm’s one when
the inverse demand is concave;
 reduce the efficient firm’s output level and increase or reduce the inefficient firm’s one when
the inverse demand is convex;
 reduce the world price of good when the inverse demand is linear or concave;
 raise the world price of good when the inverse demand is convex and c00 = c00 = 0.
It is so the case that the tax effects depend crucially on the curvature of the inverse demand.
The implication of this is that the domestic government’s strategic incentive to increase its firm’s
output level and shift profits from the foreign firm does not always work in the direction of
reducing tax rates. Notice, in particular, that if the inverse demand is linear or firms are symmetric,
then the domestic government would unambiguously want to reduce the tax rate. But if the
inverse demand is concave (convex), then the domestic government would want to increase the
tax rate if its firm is the efficient (inefficient) one.14 Finally, an increase in the tax will reduce the
world production of the good (following from (3.20)) but the effect on the world price depends on
the curvature of the inverse demand. The analysis now turns to the first stage of the game where
14 Notice that, from (3.15) and (3.16), in the case of linear demand, a reduction in the tax rate would increase both firms’
profits (compared with the Nash equilibrium level). But in the other cases of demand, a decrease in the tax rate would
increase only the domestic firm’s profits and, as a consequence, profit shifting would be stronger.
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governments choose the tax rates.
We assume that all profits from sales of the imperfectly competitive good accrue to the
representative consumer who also receives tax revenues denoted by r. Consumer income, denoted
by I , is then equal to the sum of  and r. The utility of the representative consumer is represented
by15
V (z;m; k) = u(z) +m  k; (3.21)
where u is increasing, concave and differentiable in z and so uz > 0 and uzz < 0. k is the
disutility of pollution.
The optimal tax policy is characterized by maximizing (3.21) subject to the budget constraint
given by
qz +m  I: (3.22)
Substituting (3.22) into (3.21) yields
V = u(z)  qz +  + r   k; (3.23)
with necessary condition
Vt

 dV
dt

= u0 (z) zt   qtz   qzt + t + rt   k0() = 0: (3.24)
Making use of the fact that u0 (z) = q (as an envelope property), but also that qt = p0(xt + xt ) + 1,
t = xp
0xt (following from (3.15)) and rt = z + tzt, we can rewrite (3.24) as
Vt =  zp0(xt + xt ) + xp0xt + tzt   k0() = 0: (3.25)
Equation (3.25) shows that a change in the domestic country’s tax will affect its welfare by a
number of effects.16 The first one, given by  zp0(xt + xt ), relates to the loss in consumer surplus
through the change in the oligopolistic pricing decision given by the response of the inverse
15 The utility function is assumed to be strongly separable with respect to the (sub)utility from goods and the disutility
from the global public bad. With the (sub)utility function associated with goods being quasi-linear (with the linear
part being the utility derived from the consumption of the numeraire good).
16 Recall that both p and k are functions of x and x.
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demand p0(xt + xt ). The second effect, given by xp0xt , reflects the change in profits. The third
effect, given by tzt, reflects the change in tax revenues. Finally, the term k0() relates to the change
in the disutility of pollution.
Solving (3.24) for t and collecting terms gives
tnc =
1
zt
[(z   x)p0xt + zp0xt + k0()] : (3.26)
The noncooperative optimal tax rate, denoted by nc, depends, not surprisingly, on a number of
distortions that determine its deviation from the first-best level.17 We consider first the terms of
the numerator. The first term, given by (z   x)p0xt , is the familiar terms of trade effect. This term
affects the tax through three effects: A direct one, given by z   x, and two indirect ones given by
the change in the foreign’s firm output level (xt ) and the world price (p0). Notice, in particular,
that z   x is positive (negative) if the domestic country is the importer (exporter) of the tradeable
good. The intuition for this is simple. The importing country uses its tax like a tariff in an attempt
to manipulate the terms of trade. It has, therefore, an incentive to increase its tax rate in order to
decrease the imported quantity. Conversely, the exporting country has an incentive to decrease its
tax rate in order to increase the exported quantity. The second term, given by zp0xt, relates to the
imperfectly competitive market effect on consumption level (z) that affects the tax rate through
the change in the world price (p0) and the national firm’s output level (xt). Finally, the third term,
given by k0(), represents the (national) pollution effect on tax through the change in the world
output level.
The denominator of (3.49)—given by zt—represents the response of demand with respect to a
change in tax. Upon substituting (3.5) into (3.3) we obtain
zt = z
0(qt) = z0(pt + 1): (3.27)
17 That is, when the tax rate is set just equal to the marginal damage, i.e. tnc = k0():
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Since z0 is negative the sign of zt depends on the sign of (pt + 1). If the inverse demand is
convex and c00 = c00 = 0, then pt is unambiguous positive. Then, following from (3.5), the
consumer price increases (qt > 0) and, following from (3.27), demand decreases (zt < 0). But if
the inverse demand is linear or concave pt is negative that is, the sign of zt depends on whether
jptj ? 1 implying that the consumer price will not change one-to-one with the change in the tax.
In particular, if jptj > 1 the consumer price will decrease by more than the change in the tax and,
thus, the consumer price declines (qt < 0) and demand increases (zt > 0). Conversely, if jptj < 1
the consumer price will increase by more than the change in the tax and, thus, the consumer price
increases (qt > 0) and demand decreases (zt < 0):18
It now remains to consider the sign of tnc. To simplify matters, and also avoid tedious case
distinctions, we will assume that an increase in the domestic tax rate will reduce both firms’
output that is, xt < 0 and xt < 0:19 Suppose now that the domestic country is the importer of
the tradeable good. In this case, the terms of the numerator in (3.26) are positive. Hence if zt
is also positive, then tnc is positive that is, it is a consumption tax with its rate being above the
marginal damage from pollution. On the contrary, if zt is negative, then tnc is negative that is, it is
a consumption subsidy. There is some intuition behind these results. If zt is positive then, as noted
earlier, pt is negative. Therefore, if the domestic country wants to improve its terms of trade, it
would choose to tax consumption in order to cause a reduction in the world price. Conversely, if
18 To be more precise, suppose that c00 = c00 = 0: Substituting for xx, xx , xx and xx into (3.17), dividing
through by p02 and letting R  (x+ x)p00p0 , one can rewrite (3.27) as
zt =  z02p0

1 +R
3 +R
  1
p0z0

:
Since by assumptions the term  z02p0 is positive, the sign of zt depends on the sign of the terms in the bracket. If
the inverse demand is linear R = 0 then zt > 0 when p0 > 3=z0. If the inverse demand is concave R <  1 then
zt > 0 when p0 > (3 + R)= (1 +R) z0. Making now use of the fact that p0 = 1=(z0 + z0), one obtains that zt > 0
when z0 <  3z0=2 (if demand is linear) or when z0 <  z0(3 +R)=2 (if demand is concave). And so, the domestic
consumer’s response to the tax depends on the elasticities of both demands that determine the firms’ price setting.
19 These properties unambiguously hold if the inverse demand is linear or the firms’ marginal costs are equal. But if the
inverse demand function is convex or concave, then at least one of fxt; xt g is negative. This fact imposes a restriction
on the derivation of an unambiguous, and easily interpretable, sign of the optimal tax.
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zt is negative then pt is positive. Hence, the domestic country would improve its terms of trade by
subsidizing consumption, but it would do this at the expense of higher pollution.20;21
If the domestic country is the exporter of the tradeable good, the sign of tnc is ambiguous since
the terms in the numerator have opposite signs. In particular, if zt < (>)0 the terms of trade effect
is positive (negative) while the imperfect competition and pollution effects are negative (positive).
We turn now to the analysis of origin principle of taxation.
3.4.2 Origin principle of taxation
Under the origin principle consumers—no matter where they reside—pay the tax to the country
in which the good is produced. Thus, arbitrage dictates that consumers across countries pay the
same price for the tradeable good. Denoting the world price by q, the profits of the domestic and
foreign firm are given, respectively, by
 = xq(x+ x)  x  c(x) ;  = xq(x+ x)   x   c(x); (3.28)
where q(x+ x) is the inverse demand of the good with
q0 = 1=(z0 + z0) < 0: (3.29)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximization for the domestic and foreign firm are,
respectively, given
x = xq
0 + q      c0 = 0 ; x = xq0 + q       c0 = 0 (3.30)
xx = 2q
0 + xq00   c00 < 0 ; xx = 2q0 + xq00   c00 < 0: (3.31)
20 Brander and Spencer (1984) have shown that the sign of the optimum tariff depends on the curvature of the demand
and that a linear demand involves a positive tariff. Our results, however, suggest that this case of a demand function
may involve a negative tariff too. The explanation behind this difference is that an import tariff affects only the
foreign firm’s rents while a consumption tax affects as well domestic consumption. Therefore, in our model, if
a consumption tax implies less consumption of the imperfectly competitive good (a consequence of the higher
consumer price), then the optimal policy will be to subsidize it rather than to tax it.
21 Notice that zt is unambiguous negative if the demand is convex and c00 = c00 = 0: The implication of this is that
under this case of demand, the government’s incentive to increase consumption by subsidising the good is strong.
The opposite argument holds in the case of a concave demand, and so the optimal tax may be positive or at least
higher (in absolute value) to that of a convex demand (see also Haufler et al., 2005).
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It is assumed that
xx  q0 + xq00 < 0 ; xx  q0 + xq00 < 0; (3.32)
xx < xx ; 

xx < 

xx; (3.33)
o  xxxx   xxxx > 0: (3.34)
Relegating the details to Appendix G, we have that
q =
q0(xx   xx)
o
> 0; (3.35)
x =
xx
o
< 0; (3.36)
x =  
xx
o
> 0; (3.37)
x + x

 =
xx   xx
o
< 0: (3.38)
Finally, it is the case that
 ( d
d
) = xx + xx

 +
@
@
; (3.39)
which upon substituting x = 0, @@ =  x and x = xq0, becomes
 = x(q
0x   1) < 0: (3.40)
Similarly,
 (
d
d
) = x(q0x   1) ? 0: (3.41)
In contrast to the case of the destination principle, the comparative static effects can be readily
signed. Following from (3.36), an increase in the domestic tax reduces the domestic firm’s output
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level while it increases the foreign firm’s output level (following from (3.37)) and the world
price (following from (3.35)). The intuition behind these results goes as follows. If the domestic
government chooses a positive tax rate, it will increase the domestic firm’s marginal cost and,
therefore, will reduce its output level. Then, the foreign firm will increase its output level but
by a smaller proportion than the decrease in the domestic firm’s output level. As a result, the
world output level will decline (following from (3.38)) causing an upward pressure on the world
price (following from (3.35)). In the new equilibrium, the domestic firm’s profits will decrease
(following from (3.40)) while the foreign firm’s profits will increase if and only if x is greater
than 1=q0 (following from (3.41)). It is, therefore, the case that domestic output/profits can
increase if there is a relaxation in environmental standards.
The utility of the representative consumer takes the form
V (z;m; k) = u(z)  qz +  + r   k; (3.42)
with necessary condition
V ( dV
d
) =  zq + r +    k0() = 0; (3.43)
which—upon substituting q = q0(x + x ), r = x+ x and  = x(q0x   1) (following from
(3.39))—becomes
V =  zq0(x + x ) + xq0x + x   k0() = 0: (3.44)
Solving (3.44) for  and collecting terms gives
nc =
1
x
[(z   x)q0x + zq0x + k0()] : (3.45)
Consider first the terms in the numerator of (3.45). (Recall that both q and k are functions of x
and x.) The first term, given by (z   x)q0x , reflects the terms of trade effect which depends on
(the change in) the world price (q0) and the foreign firm’s output level (x ):22 This effect, contrary
22 This effect, contrary to the case of the destination-based tax, tends to decrease (increase) the tax if the domestic
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to the case of the destination-based tax, tends to decrease (increase) the tax rate if the domestic
country is the importer (exporter) of the tradeable good. The key factor behind this difference
is that imports and exports are now evaluated at tax-inclusive prices. If the domestic country is
therefore the importer it has an incentive to increase the tax rate as a way to decrease imports
(quantity effect). This effect will lead to a deterioration in the foreign country’s trade balance
leading to a fall in its terms of trade. Anticipating this, the foreign country will increase its tax
rate to cause an increase in the price of the domestic country’s imports (price effect). Whether
(or not) the foreign country will eventually achieve an improvement on its trade balance depends
on which of these effects dominates and, hence, it depends on the magnitude of the elasticities
of demand and supply. The second term, given by zq0x , relates to the imperfectly competitive
market effect on consumption level (z) through the change in the world price (q0) and the national
firm’s output level (xt). Finally, the third term, given by k0() represents the (national) pollution
effect as a consequence to change in the world output level.
If the domestic country is the exporter of the tradeable good, then nc is negative (since
x < 0) that is, it is a production subsidy.23 However, if the domestic country is the importer of
the tradeable good the sign of nc is ambiguous, being dependent on the relative magnitudes of
the terms in the numerator. In particular, given the sign of the x , the effects arising from the
imperfectly competitive market and the existence of pollution take both a negative sign. Yet,
interestingly, if the domestic country has balanced trade (and so z = x), then the sign of nc is
unambiguously negative.24 To emphasize:
country is the importer (exporter).
23 A production subsidy in the case of the exporter is against her terms of trade. This result is well-known from Brander
and Spencer (1985), who have shown that unilateral export subsidies are optimal even though the terms of trade move
against the subsidizing countries. The additional feature here therefore is, as in Barrett (1994), that export subsidies
work against the environmental quality, too.
24 Notice that the corresponding destination-based tax, tnc, can be of either sign depending on the signs of xt and zt.
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Proposition 7 a) Under the destination principle of taxation, the optimal tax rate is positive when
the polluting good is imported, and is lower when the polluting good is exported, if the inverse
demand is linear and zt > 0. If the inverse demand is concave or convex, the sign of the optimal
tax is ambiguous, being dependent on the magnitudes of terms that capture the terms of trade,
imperfect competition and pollution. b) Under the origin principle, the optimal tax rate is negative
when the polluting good is exported and is lower (in absolute value) when the polluting good is
imported.
Clearly, the level of the noncooperative taxes depends critically on the tax principle. Since the
tax under the origin principle affects directly the production decisions of the firms, contrary to the
tax under the destination principle, the incentive to subsidize will be strong in both countries. The
implication of this is that the presence of pollution (a public bad) makes the destination principle
more desirable. (We postpone the discussion of the global welfare comparison until Section 3.6).
We turn now to a discussion of the cooperative equilibrium, as it will identify the inefficiencies of
the noncooperative equilibrium just characterized.
3.5 Cooperative equilibrium
Suppose now that a social planner chooses tax rates to maximize global welfare.
3.5.1 Destination principle of taxation
The cooperative solution consists of choosing both t and t to maximize global welfare given
by
W = 1V + 2V
; (3.46)
where 1 (2) denotes the weight attached to domestic (foreign) welfare. Using (3.23) and its
foreign analogue, the necessary conditions for a maximum W are
Wt( dW
dt
) = 1 [ zqt + t + rt   k0()] + 2 [ zqt + t + rt   k0()] = 0; (3.47)
and
Wt( dW
dt
) = 1 [ zqt + t + rt   k0()] + 2 [ zqt + t + rt   k0()] = 0: (3.48)
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Solving (3.47) with respect to t gives
tc(tc) =
1
1zt

1 [(z   x)p0xt + zp0xt + k0()] +
2 [(z
   x)p0xt + zp0xt   tczt + k0()]

; (3.49)
where a similar condition holds for tc(tc). Close observetion of (3.49) reveals that the cooperative
optimal tax structure, denoted by c, is composed of two additive terms. The first term (lhs bracket)
consists of the same effects identified in the noncooperative tax structure [see (3.26) and the
preceding discussion]. But the second term (rhs bracket) consists of four new effects all related
to the foreign country’s welfare. The first effect—(z   x)p0xt—reflects the foreign terms of
trade effect being dependent on changes in the world price (p0) and the domestic firm’s output
level (xt). The second term—zp0xt—relates to the existence of imperfect competition: The third
effect—tczt —reflects the change in the foreign country’s tax revenues due to changes in that
country’s taxes. Finally, the term k0() relates to the foreign pollution effect.
Clearly, as the preceding paragraph shows, cooperative behaviour does not completely
eliminate unilateral incentives. The reason for this rests with the different weights that the social
planner places on the two countries. To be more specific, making use of (3.26) and (3.49) and
their foreign analogues and rearranging, one obtains
(tc   tnc)1zt =  2V t ; (3.50)
(tc   tnc)2zt =  1Vt : (3.51)
Condition (3.50) simply states that in the cooperative equilibrium the domestic country will adapt
a tax rate, tc, that differs from its corresponding noncooperative tax rate, tnc, to the extent that
the cost of doing so—given by (tc   tnc)1zt—is equal in value to the external cost imposed to
the foreign country’s welfare—2V t —when the domestic country is acting noncooperatively. A
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similar condition applies to the foreign country and given in (3.51). Therefore, whether (or not)
tc (tc) is higher than tnc (tnc) it depends on the signs of zt(zt) and V t (Vt). This indicates that
when zt 6= zt and/or Vt 6= V t , the optimal cooperative policy will not involve any harmonization
of taxes (see also Duval and Hamilton, 2002).
3.5.2 Origin principle of taxation
Using (3.42), and its foreign analogue, the first-order conditions for a maximum with respect
to  and   are, respectively,
W ( dW
d
) = 1 [ zq +  + r   k0()] + 2
 zq +  + r   k0() = 0; (3.52)
and
W( dW
d 
) = 1 [ zq +  + r   k0()] + 2
 zq +  + r   k0() = 0: (3.53)
Solving (3.52) with respect to  yields
 c( c) =
1
1x

1 [(z   x)q0x + zq0x + k0()] +
2 [(z
   x)q0x + zq0x    cx + k0()]

; (3.54)
where a similar condition holds for  c( c). Making use of (3.45) and (3.54) and their foreign
analogues, one obtains
( c   nc)1x =  2V  ; (3.55)
( c    nc)2x =  1V : (3.56)
Condition (3.55) states that the domestic cooperative tax rate diverges from its corresponding
noncooperative—( c   nc)1x—to the extent that it internalizes the welfare loss of the foreign
country—2V  —when the domestic country behaves noncooperatively. The same argument
applies to the foreign country and given in (3.56). Therefore, whether (or not)  c ( c) > nc
( nc) depends on the sign of V  (V) since x and x are negative. Consequently, if x 6= x
and/or V  6= V then the optimal cooperative tax rate is non-harmonized between countries.
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3.6 The linear case
The generality of the model does not lend itself to a straightforward comparison of the two tax
principles. To see the possibilities, in what follows, we assume that the inverse demand functions
are linear (and identical across countries) taking the form
z(q) = z(q) =   q; (3.57)
with  = 10 and  = 1, and the production cost functions are also linear with
C = cx  f ; C = cx   f ; (3.58)
where f (= f ) = 0 is the fixed cost and c (c) > 0 is the marginal production cost.25 It will also
be assumed that pollution functions are also linear (and identical across countries) and take the
form
k = k = x+ x; (3.59)
where () > 0 is the marginal pollution cost.26
With these restrictions, the optimal noncooperative domestic destination- origin-based taxes
are given, respectively, by
t =
1
5
[(z   2x) + 2(+ )] ; (3.60)
 =  1
4
(z + x) +   

2
: (3.61)
Two points need to be emphasized here: firstly, under the origin principle of taxation there is an
incentive to under-tax—given by the term  (z + x)—while under the destination principle there
is an incentive to over (under)-tax if z > (<)2x. Secondly, under the origin principle of taxation
25 Two cases are explored: the case of symmetric production costs that is, c = c and the case of asymmetric production
costs that is, c 6= c. Notice that, since the countries are assumed to be identical in all other aspects, the country with
the more efficient firm will export the tradeable good.
26 We refer to the firm with the lower marginal pollution cost as the cleaner firm. Yet changes in  and  will capture
the effect of the severity of pollution on the optimal tax rates and will be denoted by e:
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the marginal damage is ‘discounted’ by the term    
2
while under the destination principle of
taxation it is fully internalized, something that is reflected in the term 2( + ). However, this
aspect can give an advantage to the origin principle of taxation in the sense that it would allow for
a lower tax rate to the cleaner firm (we return to this shortly below).
Next we provide the results derived by stimulating the model for different set of parameter
values.27 The results focus on the global welfare W = V + V  [given by (3.23) and (3.42) and
their foreign analogues]. Recall that an increase in the destination-based tax rate will reduce both
firms’ output levels while an increase in the origin-based tax rate will reduce the national firm’s
output level and increase the rival firm’s output level.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the noncooperative tax rates assuming that firms differ only in their
production costs [c = 1, c = 3 and  = ]. Observe that under the destination principle (DP) the
importer sets a positive tax rate after a level of pollution (e > 0:53) which is higher than that of
the exporter at all levels of pollution. Under the origin principle (OP), the exporter sets always a
negative tax rate which is below than that of the importer at all levels of pollution. Indeed, the
importer sets a positive tax rate at high levels of pollution (e > 4). These results confirm the
intuition behind Proposition 7 in the sense that the incentive to under-tax depends crucially on
whether the good is imported or exported and on whether the tax is destination- or origin-based.
Notice also that under the OP the difference in tax rates between the exporter and the importer is
greater than that under the DP. The implication of this is that under the OP the efficient firm is
allowed to produce more than under the DP.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the noncooperative tax rates assuming that firms differ only in their
pollution costs [ = 1,  = 3 and c = c]. Notice that under the DP both countries set positive
27 Computations, available upon request, have been performed in Maple.
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Figure 3.1: Noncooperative tax rates under asymmetric production costs.
Figure 3.2: Noncooperative tax rates under asymmetric pollution costs.
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and equal tax rates implying that, since the countries are identical to other aspects, both firms will
produce the same level of output in equilibrium. But, interestingly, under the OP the tax rates
differ substantially between the two countries. In particular, the exporter (which is the country
where the cleaner firm operates) sets always a negative tax rate while the importer sets a positive
tax rate after a given level of marginal production cost. The implication of this is that under the
OP the dirty firm is taxed while the cleaner firm is not.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 compare the global welfare levels under asymmetric production costs.28
Figure 3.3 shows that the OP dominates when the level of pollution is zero or very low
(e 2 [0; 0:86)) but at higher level of pollution (e 2 [0:86; 2:5]) the DP dominates. Figure 3.4
however shows that when the level of asymmetry in production costs is higher, then the area of
dominance of the DP is smaller (e 2 [1:4; 2:6]). Notice that the difference in the welfare levels
is decreasing in the level of the asymmetry in production costs and increasing in the level of
pollution (see also Figure (H.1)).
Figure 3.3: Areas of domination under asymmetric production costs.
28 Figure 3 assumes that c = 2c and Figure 4 that c = 3c.  =  in both figures.
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Figure 3.4: Areas of domination under higher asymmetric production costs.
Figure 3.5: Areas of domination under asymmetric production and pollution costs.
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Figure 3.5 assumes that there is asymmetry in both production and pollution costs.29 Notice,
interestingly, that the OP entirely dominates the DP. There is a straightforward intuition behind
the above results. As noted earlier, under the OP in place both countries choose negative tax
rates. This, on one hand, implies high level of production and so consumption which will tend
to increase welfare. But, on the other hand, it implies high level of pollution which will tend
to decrease welfare. Thus, as the severity of pollution increases and countries do not alleviate
their under-tax incentive, the level of welfare under the OP will reduce. Under the DP, however,
countries do set positive tax rates at higher levels of pollution. This fact will therefore tend to
favor the DP at higher levels of pollution. But ‘heavy’ taxation on the imperfectly competitive
good have an adverse effect on welfare (by restricting further the sub-optimal production levels).
This will tend to undermine the dominance of the DP and for sufficient level of asymmetry in
production costs, the production efficiency imposed by the OP will compensate for the higher
level of pollution. Then, the difference in welfare between the two tax principles will become very
small and, thus, for sufficient level of asymmetry in pollution costs the OP will dominate. Indeed,
the OP will dominate even if there is asymmetry only in pollution costs (see Figure H.2).30
Cremer and Gahvari’s (2006) model predicts that if the DP results in lower pollution levels, it
will Pareto dominate the OP. But if pollution levels are lower under the OP, either regime may
dominate. Our model however predicts that the OP may Pareto dominate the DP even if it entails
higher pollution levels. The key factor behind this difference is the additional distortion coming
from our imperfectly competitive setting that, as discussed above, can turn the welfare comparison
29 Figure 3.5 assumes that c = 2c and  = 2 or, equivalently, that the efficient firm is also the cleaner one. In the case
where the efficient firm is the dirty one, it has been observed that the OP would not dominate the DP for high level of
pollution.
30 Notice that with the OP in place, the asymmetry in production and pollution costs implies higher total production of
the tradeable good but with a lower level of pollution (if the efficient firm is cleaner). Hence, the disutility from the
global bad is smaller from that under symmetric pollution costs. Indeed, it is smaller than that under the DP when
firms are fully asymmetric. These results therefore suggest that asymmetric pollution costs can favor the OP.
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in favor of the OP.
Figure 3.6: Cooperative and noncooperative welfare levels.
Figure 3.6 compares the tax principles by using as criterion the welfare level of the cooperative
symmetric equilibrium [c = c = 1 and  = ]. Notice that at low levels of pollution (or zero) the
welfare level of the cooperative equilibrium coincide with that of the OP, but at higher levels of
pollution they coincide with that of the DP.31 This result suggests that the DP dominates the OP
when pollution is relatively high and firms are fully symmetric.
Keen and Lahiri (1998) provide results that favor the OP over the DP when taxes are set
cooperatively and firms have different production costs or when taxes are set noncooperatively
and firms are symmetric. However, our results have shown that the presence of a global public
bad can give favorable results to the DP in both asymmetric and symmetric settings.32
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has investigated commodity taxation as an alternative indirect pollution
tax—destination- and origin-based—on a polluting good produced under condition of imperfect
31 In particular, the cooperative tax rates were negative for low levels of pollution. The intuition behind this is that
without trade considerations—since the countries are fully symmetric—the effect of the output distortion is stronger
than the pollution effect and so the cooperative taxes are negative. This also explains the fact the welfare level of the
OP coincides with that of the cooperative solution for low (or zero) levels of pollution.
32 The model does not capture the fact that subsidies are a costly instrument for countries to use. Incorporating this
issue by assigning an exogenous weight  > 1 to each dollar of tax revenue collected, following Hashimzade et al.
(2005) and Haufler et al. (2005), it has been observed, not surprisingly, that this effect would tend to reduce the area
of dominance of the OP in both symmetric and asymmetric settings.
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competition. With the only available fiscal policy instrument being the commodity taxes, it has
discussed which principle performs better (in terms of welfare) in the presence of a global public
bad.
The general analysis has shown that the strategic incentive for low-tax levels depends on
the principle of taxation. Additionally, it has shown that this incentive becomes stronger or not
depending on whether the tradeable good is exported or imported. The analysis of the linear case
has provided clearer insights regarding which tax principle dominates in welfare. On balance, the
results of the special case have shown that if firms are symmetric, or not sufficiently asymmetric
and/or the pollution levels are relatively high, then the destination principle is to be preferred.
Contrary to this, if firms are sufficiently asymmetric and/or the pollution levels are relatively low,
then the origin principle is to be preferred. The implication of these results is that the answer to
which principle performs better is unambiguous, being dependent on the level of global public
bad and the degree of heterogeneity between firms.
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Appendix G
Derivation of (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19).
The comparative static effects dp
dt
( pt), dxdt ( xt) and dx

dt
( xt ) can be obtained from
the market clearing condition (3.4) and the first-order conditions (3.8). Re-writing them for
convenience as follows
z + z   x  x = 0;
p0x+ p = c0;
p0x + p = c0;
making use of (3.9), (3.11) and the fact that dz = z0(dp + dt) (dz = z0(dp + dt)) [from (3.5)
and (3.7)] and that p0 = 1=(z0 + z0), and perturbing them (abusing notation somewhat), gives in
matrix form 241  p0  p01 xx   p0 xx   p0
1 xx   p0 xx   p0
3524 dpdx
dx
35 =
24 p0z0dt  p0z0dt0
0
35 :
Setting dt = 0, diving through by dt and solving the above system of equations by applying
the Cramer’s rule, yields—after using (3.13)—(3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) as given in text.
Determination of the signs of (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19).
By assumptions p0z0
d
> 0. We can therefore rewrite (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19)—after substituting
for xx, xx , xx , xx [from (3.9) and (3.11)] and gathering terms—as follows
sign(pt) =  sign([p02 + p0p00(x+ x)  p00(xc00 + xc00)  p0(c00 + c00)]); (G.1)
sign (xt) = sign[p
0 + p00(x   x)  c00]; (G.2)
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sign (xt ) = sign[p
0 + p00(x  x)  c00]: (G.3)
Consider first the sign of xt and xt . Substituting the equilibrium values of x and x [from (3.10)]
into (G.2) and (G.3) we get
sign (xt) = sign[(p
0   c00) + p
00
p0
(c0   c0)]; (G.4)
sign (xt ) = sign[(p
0   c00) + p
00
p0
(c0   c0)]: (G.5)
It is easy to verify that if c0 = c0, then both xt and xt are negative [since (p0   ci00) < 0 by (3.9)].
However, in the asymmetric case at least one of fxt; xtg must be negative. To identify which one
we have to investigate the curvature of the inverse demand curve:
(a) If the inverse demand is linear (p00 = 0) the signs of xt and xt are negative. In particular,
the effect of tax on xt is stronger to that of xt if c00 > c00.
(b) If the inverse demand is concave (p00 < 0), then xt < 0 requires
(p0   c00) + p
00
p0
(c0   c0) < 0: (G.6)
Since p0   c00 < 0 and p00
p0 > 0, xt < 0 holds if c
0 > c0. By (G.5) then xt > (<)0 if
p0   c00 < (>)p00
p0 (c
0   c0).
(c) If the inverse demand is convex (p00 > 0) then p00
p0 < 0. Hence xt < 0 holds if c
0 < c0. By
(G.5) then xt > (<)0 if p0   c00 > (<)p
00
p0 (c
0   c0).
Let us now consider the sign of pt. If the inverse demand curve is linear or concave
then—following immediately by substituting p00 = 0 (p00 < 0) into (G.1)—pt < 0. However, if the
inverse demand is convex the sign of pt is ambiguous because the terms of the rhs of (G.1) are of
opposite sign. To make progress one this, we will assume that c00 = c00 = 0. Then (G.1) can be
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written as
sign(pt) =  sign[p02 + p0p00(x+ x)]: (G.7)
Dividing now through by p02 letting R  (x + x)p00
p0 the rhs of (G.7) is equal to 1 + R. But R
exceeds  1 in the case of a convex inverse demand implying that 1 + R must be negative. Hence
pt > 0.
Derivation of (3.35), (3.36) and (3.37).
The comparative static effects dq
d
( q ), dxd ( x ) and dx

d
( x ) can be obtained from
the market clearing condition (3.4) and the first-order conditions (3.30). Re-writing them for
convenience as follows.
z + z   x  x = 0;
q0x+ q = c0    ;
q0x + q = c0 +  ;
making use of (3.31), (3.32) and the fact that q0 = 1=(z0 + z0), and perturbing them (abusing
notation somewhat) gives in matrix form241  q0  q01 xx   q0 xx   q0
1 xx   q0 xx   q0
3524 dqdx
dx
35 =
24 0d
d 
35
Setting d  = 0 and diving through by d , the above system yields—after using (3.34)—(3.35),
(3.36) and (3.37) as given in the text.
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Appendix H
Welfare comparisons
Figure H.1: Symmetric pollution and asymmetric production costs.
Notice that as the level of asymmetry increases the difference in welfare levels between the two
tax principles is getting smaller. But as level of pollution increases, the difference is getting larger
in all cases of asymmetry (with c = 1).
Figure H.2: Symmetric production and asymmetric pollution costs.
Notice that the OP dominates and the difference in welfare levels is increasing both in the level
of asymmetry in pollution costs ( = 3) and the level of production costs (c = c).
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